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1 Theorizing ideational continuity: The
resilience of neo-liberal
ideas in Europe
vivien a. schmidt and mark thatcher
. . . the ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they
are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than commonly
understood. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt
from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct
economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling
their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back. I am sure
that the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the
gradual encroachment of ideas.
John Maynard Keynes (1936, p. 383)
When Keynes wrote these lines, he certainly had in mind the influence
of the ideas of laissez-faire economic liberalism, which he held respon-
sible for the great boom and bust of the 1920s that led to the Great
Depression of the 1930s. Today, another form of economic liberal-
ism, neo-liberalism, has supplanted Keynes’s own ideas, which had
gained dominance in the postwar era. Our task, in this theoretical
essay, is to explain how and why the ideas of neo-liberal economists
and political philosophers obtained and retained their power in Euro-
pean policy debates and political discourse during the past three or
four decades.
We define ‘neo-liberalism’, at its essence, as involving a commitment
to certain core principles focused on market competition and a limited
state. Our purpose is to explain the resilience of these core neo-liberal
ideas, meaning their ability to endure, recur, or adapt over time; to
predominate against rivals; and to survive despite their own many
failures. We offer five lines of analysis as potential explanations for
such resilience: first, the generality, flexibility, and mutability of neo-
liberal ideas themselves; second, the gap between neo-liberal rhetoric
and a reality in which they are not implemented; third, their advantages
in policy debates and political discourse compared with alternatives;
fourth, the power of interested actors who strategically adopt and
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promote neo-liberal ideas; and, fifth, the force of the institutions in
which neo-liberal ideas are embedded.
Our focus is primarily on neo-liberal ideas – their intellectual ori-
gins, history, and current importance. We recognize that a wide range
of other elements also falls under the rubric of neo-liberalism, includ-
ing institutions, practices, and policies.1 However, this book is not
about these elements or the impact of neo-liberal ideas on institutions,
policies, and practices.2 Rather, it is about neo-liberalism as a set of
ideas.
Admittedly, neo-liberal ideas are difficult to pin down because neo-
liberalism comes in many different forms, with differing assumptions
that often appear contradictory. They are also politically contentious,
being the subject of polemics in policy debates and political discourse.
For this reason, many scholars have chosen to leave aside the study
of neo-liberal ideas to focus on policies, politics, interests, and institu-
tions. As a result, however, they give up without even first attempting
to explain one of the main forces in Europe’s political economy.
As for our own study of ideas, rather than returning in this essay
to the long-standing scholarly debates that address whether and to
what extent ideas matter, we take it as a given that they do and seek
instead to develop theories about how to explain continuity through
the concept of resilience. To do this effectively, we outline a framework
for analysing neo-liberal ideas as objects of explanation. We consider
different views of how to theorize about the role of neo-liberal ideas,
from positivist to constructivist; what forms such ideas may take –
whether philosophical, programmatic, or policy ideas – and how they
may change over time; and who are the neo-liberal agents of continuity
or change.
This introductory chapter begins by defining ‘neo-liberalism’ (or
‘economic liberalism’, as it is also called) within the larger conceptual
tradition of liberalism in order to explain what it is and is not for the
purposes of this book. We follow this definition with a brief overview
of the intellectual origins of the concept beginning in the 1930s and
its subsequent transformations, in particular from the 1980s onwards.
We then provide an analysis of the ideational roles, forms, and agents
1 See, for example, Larner 2000, Cerny 2008, Mudge 2008, and Evans and
Sewell 2013.
2 For excellent recent studies of neo-liberal policies and their institutional
impacts, see Crouch 2011, Streeck 2011, and Grant and Wilson 2012.
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of neo-liberalism. We conclude the chapter with a discussion of how
such neo-liberal ideas can be shown to be resilient following the five
lines of analysis.
Conceptualizing neo-liberalism
There is no single definition of neo-liberalism beyond the agreement
that it contains a commitment to core principles involving market com-
petition and a limited state. Thereafter there exist important debates
and differences in defining what neo-liberalism is and in describing its
origins and development.3
Sometimes neo-liberalism is portrayed mainly as a political and eco-
nomic philosophy defining a set of free-market–oriented economic
principles and political economic practices promoted in its early years
by a loose agglomeration of ‘true believers’.4 At other times, it is
cast as an ideology through which the free-market discourse of the
‘converted’ (i.e., elites in academe, business, journalism, and politics)
seeks to persuade the public of the virtues of unfettered markets guar-
anteeing individual freedom along with material prosperity.5 In yet
other instances, it is presented as a particular approach to governance,
in which neo-liberal principles and practices are deployed to liberal-
ize, privatize, deregulate, and rationalize existing markets.6 However,
neo-liberalism has also been portrayed as a political project promoted
by social forces to restore capitalist class power via ideas on how to
reorganize capital and the social order.7 The variety of treatments of
neo-liberalism also links to debates about its historical context because
it emerges from a broader liberal philosophical tradition with its own
internal divisions on how to balance state and market, individual lib-
erty and collective endeavour, and economy and society.8
3 See Peck and Tickell 2002; Harvey 2005; Mudge 2008; Brenner, Peck, and
Theodore 2010; Cerny 2008; Peck 2010; Boas and Gans-Morse 2009; and
Evans and Sewell 2013.
4 See, for example, Mirowski and Plehwe 2009 and Gamble 2009.
5 See, for example, Anderson 2000 and Freeden 2005; see also discussion in
Ferrera in this volume.
6 For a discussion, see Steger and Roy 2010 and Peck 2010.
7 See Overbeek and Apeldoorn 2012: 4–5; Apeldoorn, Drahokoupil, and Horn
2008; Cafruny and Magnus 2003; and Jessop 2002. See also discussion in
Schmidt and Woll in this volume.
8 See, for example, Audier 2012a; Nemo and Petitot 2006; Miroswki and Plehwe
2009; Harvey 2005; and Foucault 2004.
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This debate resulted in neo-liberalism appearing as a somewhat
amorphous body of thought with many different ideological strands,
normative interpretations, and policy applications in different Euro-
pean polities and in the EU. To provide greater clarity, we briefly
outline our own core definition of neo-liberalism and then trace its
intellectual history, seeking to take into account its many aspects while
pointing to themore specific analyses developed in subsequent chapters
of this book.
Towards a definition of neo-liberalism
‘Neo-liberalism’ here refers to a core set of ideas about markets and
the state’s role in (or as part of) such markets. Neo-liberals believe
that markets should be as ‘free’ as possible, meaning governed by
competition and open across borders, while the state should have a
limited political economic role in creating and preserving the institu-
tional framework that secures property rights, guarantees competition,
and promotes free trade. (We prefer the term ‘market competition’ to
‘free markets’ because the latter is both normatively loaded – who,
after all, would be against more freedom? – and misleading because
competition depends on the state playing a role.) Just how far market
competition extends and just how limited the state should be depends
on the strand of neo-liberalism involved. Laissez-faire neo-liberals tend
to want a strong but highly limited state; anarcho-capitalists or ‘hyper
neo-liberals’ want to dismantle the state as much as possible in order to
leave almost everything to the market; and social-market neo-liberals –
often called ordo-liberals, following the economic philosophy devel-
oped in Germany – embrace a more active state with greater social
obligations.9
Our use of the term ‘neo-liberalism’ in this chapter is centred on the
strand of economic liberalism as popularized by Margaret Thatcher
and Ronald Reagan in the late 1970s and early 1980s, whose dis-
course promised the reduction of the state and declared their belief
in the virtues of competition and ‘the free market’. We ignore the
hyper neo-liberals, who rarely had significant political influence. We
see ordo-liberalism, largely developed in Germany, as constituting a
9 See Gamble 2009: 70–84 and in this volume; see also Lehmbruch 1999.
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more conservative strand of neo-liberal economic philosophy.10 We
include it and, indeed, since the Eurozone phase of the economic crisis,
we find that elements of ordo-liberalism have proved highly resilient
via the various EU pacts and treaty agreements that reinforce commit-
ments to fiscal austerity.11
The watchwords for the new, or ‘neo’, liberalism beginning in the
late 1970s and early 1980s – in Europe as in the rest of the world –
have been liberalization, privatization, commodification, regulatory
reforms, and delegation to non-majoritarian institutions such as ‘inde-
pendent’ regulatory agencies and central banks, as well as individual
responsibility, competition, and enterprise.12 Colin Hay offers a use-
ful seven-point list of key elements that characterize contemporary
neo-liberalism, as follows13:
1. A confidence in the market as an efficient mechanism for the allo-
cation of scarce resources.
2. A belief in the desirability of a global trade regime for free trade
and free capital mobility.
3. A belief in the desirability, all things being equal, of a limited and
non-interventionist role for the state and of the state as a facilitator
and custodian rather than a substitute for market mechanisms.
4. A rejection of Keynesian demand-management techniques in favour
of monetarism, neo-monetarism, and supply-side economics.14
5. A commitment to the removal of those welfare benefits that might
be seen to act as disincentives to market participation (in short, a
subordination of the principles of social justice to those of perceived
economic imperatives).
6. A defence of labour-market flexibility and the promotion and nur-
turing of cost competitiveness.
10 See, for example, Foucault 2004 and Ptak 2009 and the following discussion.
11 See Gamble, Jones, and Schmidt and Woll, all in this volume.
12 See Hermann 2007; Brenner, Peck, and Theodore 2010; Peck 2001; Cerny
2008; Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2002; and Coen and Thatcher 2005.
13 See Hay 2004.
14 Macroeconomic theory has been influenced by these neo-liberal approaches –
which were part of the neoclassical economics offensive of the 1970s – as well
as by the ‘new Keynesians’, who responded to such approaches in the 1980s.
The synthesis has come to be known as the ‘new neo-classical synthesis’ or the
‘new consensus’ that defined macroeconomic orthodoxy until the economic
crisis of the late 2000s. Our thanks go to Cornel Ban for this clarification.
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7. A confidence in the use of private finance in public projects and,
more generally, in the allocative efficiency of market and quasi-
market mechanisms in the provision of public goods.
In summary, neo-liberalism today entails belief in competitive mar-
kets enhanced by global free trade and capital mobility, backed up
by a pro-market, limited state that promotes labour-market flex-
ibility and seeks to reduce welfare dependence while marketizing
the provision of public goods. As such, neo-liberalism can be seen
as representing a theory that combines both cognitive and norma-
tive ideas about a specific type of capitalist organization of the
economy.
At the same time, neo-liberalism is highly varied. It has been adopted,
adapted, and applied in differing ways across domains from economic
markets to welfare. Equally, national variants have been established
across countries that range from traditionally ‘liberal’ economies such
as in Britain to statist and corporatist economies, such as in France,
Italy, Germany, and the Scandinavian nations, and at both national
and EU levels. Definition of the term is made more difficult by the fact
that few of those labelled as neo-liberals today actually apply the word
to themselves.15 Indeed, the normative value attached to the terms ‘lib-
eral’ and ‘neo-liberal’ vary greatly. Thus, in the United States, ‘liberal’
refers to centre-left politics, often neo-Keynesian, mildly redistributive,
and socially tolerant, and is usually applied pejoratively by the Repub-
lican right. In contrast, ‘economic liberal’ in Europe often refers to
those on the Right who are opposed to state action and seek to institute
the neo-liberalism discussed previously. Moreover, calling someone a
‘neo-liberal’ in the United Kingdom or even ‘liberal’ in Continental
Europe is most often used as a label for unpopular views. Finally, in
the political arena, economic liberalism can be attached to other philo-
sophical ideas about how to steer the economy, administer the state,
build community, and promote the welfare of society. These other
ideas may encompass conservative principles, as in the case of Mar-
garet Thatcher’s evocation of ‘Victorian values’16; or social-democratic
principles, as when Scandinavians sought to ‘save the welfare state’ by
15 See Boas and Gans-Morse 2009: 156, and Peck 2010: 13–15.
16 See Martin and Ferrera, both in this volume.
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adding neo-liberal elements; or a ‘third way’ between the two, as in the
case of the British Labour Party after the 1990s under Tony Blair.17
It is important to note in this context that neo-liberalism is not only
a philosophy of political economy, it is also a philosophy of politi-
cal democracy and the role of the state. It conceives of the polity as
consisting of the individual first and the community second, with legit-
imate state action extremely limited with regard to community-based
demands on the individual. Because neo-liberalism places individual
freedom ahead of everything else, it perceives state intervention as
imposing collective judgements on individuals’ freedom to choose.18
Significantly, neo-liberal theorizing often portrays the state as more
legitimate when transformed into an arm’s-length arbitrator state as
compared with the traditional political or administrative state, which
it fears distorts markets by enabling certain interest groups to gain
political advantage or administrative support through ‘capture’.
The intellectual origins and development of neo-liberalism
Disentangling neo-liberalism analytically from other forms of liberal-
ism requires careful analysis. In his chapter, Maurizio Ferrera notes
that in Italian, the language itself provides clarification that does not
exist in English.Liberalesimo refers to the centuries-old Lockean philo-
sophical tradition focused on the constitutional protection of individ-
ual freedoms. Liberalismo covers a range of different ‘liberalisms’,
including the economic, focused on private property and free markets;
the political, concerned with rights and democracy; and the social,
encompassing welfare rights and collective responsibilities. Finally,
only liberismo concerns what we have named neo-liberalism, which
perceives the free market as primary, resulting in its focus on free
enterprise, free trade, and efficiency.
Interwar Vienna of the 1920s witnessed the beginning of such neo-
liberalism,19 with major development occurring during the 1930s and
17 See Schmidt 2000; see also Schmidt and Woll in this volume.
18 See, for example, the discussion in Harvey 2005; see also Gamble and Schmidt
and Woll, both in this volume.
19 In the 1920s Vienna, Ludwig von Mises held seminars with regular attendees
including Friedrich von Hayek and Fritz Machlup, along with foreign scholars
such as Lionel Robbins of the United Kingdom and Frank Knight of the United
States. Note that some date the Austrian School’s neo-liberalism to the 1880s,
with Carl Menger. See Blyth 2013b.
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culminating in 1938 with the Colloque Lippmann, the Paris con-
ference centred on Walter Lippmann that brought together a wide
range of intellectual, political, and business leaders sympathetic to his
thought.20 At this time, neo-liberalism was conceptualized mainly as a
response to the failures of classical liberalism in confronting the chal-
lenges of the Great Depression as well as to the perceived dangers from
socialist planning. It retained the classical liberal definitions of individ-
uals as motivated by self-interest and of competition as the principle
for market functioning. However, most neo-liberals rejected classi-
cal liberalism’s laissez-faire approach to market regulation,21 insisting
instead on the need for a strong state able to establish general rules for
markets. This was particularly well developed in the work of Friedrich
von Hayek (1944), who rejected both laissez-faire and state planning
for industry.22 Neo-liberalism also inverted classical liberalism’s basic
tenet – that political liberty ensures free markets – and instead argued
that economic freedom is essential for political freedom.23 This claim
was the basis of Hayek’s (1944) Road to Serfdom, as well as the
main theme of Milton Friedman’s (1962) Capitalism and Freedom. By
20 In the 1930s, in addition to the protagonists of the 1920s (see previous
footnote), key figures included Edward Canaan and his disciples in the
Economics Department at the London School of Economics, Louis Rougier in
France, and the Geneva Institut Universitaire des Hautes Etudes
Internationales headed by Willam E. Rappard and Paul Mantoux, which
provided refuge for a wide range of intellectuals fleeing the Nazis and the war,
including von Mises, the German Wilhelm Ro¨pke, and the Italian Luigi
Einaudi in 1943. See Plehwe 2009 11–13. Their influence was even felt in
Spain in the mid 1940s, when a prominent ordo-liberal (right-wing) economist,
Heinrich von Stackelberg, became a visiting professor at the University of
Madrid from 1943 until his death in 1946 and, as such, influenced a future
generation of economists and policy makers; see Ban 2013. The ‘Colloque
Lippmann’ gathered a wide range of neo-liberal luminaries such as Rougier,
with attendees including von Mises, Hayek, and Ro¨pke, among others, along
with Lippmann himself. See, for example, Denord 2007: 89–122, and Audier
2012.
21 Or, at least, their interpretation of classical liberalism as a laissez-faire
approach to the markets. In fact, liberalism had developed in many directions,
including ‘social liberalism’ and ‘new liberalism’ in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. See Freeden 1978.
22 See Gamble 1996 and in this volume; and Wapshott 2012. See also Schmidt
and Woll in this volume.
23 See Foucault 2004 and Tribe 2009; see also discussion in Schmidt and Woll in
this volume.
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putting the economy before the polity, neo-liberals presented the mar-
kets as the neutral solution and the state as the politicized problem.24
This also enabled neo-liberalism’s founding theorists to eschew tra-
ditional social ethics and instead to view competition as the moral
standard, with competitive markets serving to define merit as well as
to justify inequalities of situation, whereas notions of collective respon-
sibility beyond a basic minimum could be perceived as interfering with
markets.25
The inception of a self-conscious intellectual (or ideological) neo-
liberal movement is generally traced back to the postwar period when
ideas of state intervention and centralized planning were widespread.
An especially important organization was the Mont Pe`lerin Soci-
ety (founded in 1947), which held regular meetings of intellectuals,
academics, business people, and political figures, particularly from
Europe.26 The Mont Pe`lerin Society brought together, at one time or
another, the main figures of neo-liberalism, including not only the
expected figures: Austrian thinkers such as Friedrich Hayek, located
at the London School of Economics, and one of the initial organiz-
ers of the group; US economists such as Milton Friedman, leader of
the Chicago School of Economics, and James Buchanan, founder of
the Virginia School of public-choice theory; as well as neo-classical
economists. There were also German ‘ordo-liberal’ thinkers such as
Alexander Ru¨stow and Wilhelm Ro¨pke, along with politicians such
as Ludwig Erhard, the future Chancellor of Germany, and Alfred
Armack-Mu¨ller, architects of Germany’s social-market economy; Ital-
ian thinker and future President Luigi Einaudi; and other well-known
figures, such as Karl Popper and Arthur Seldon. Other think tanks
promoting neo-liberal ideas were also established, in particular in the
United Kingdom (e.g., the Institute of Economic Affairs) and the United
States (e.g., the neo-conservative Heritage Foundation).
The postwar neo-liberals opposed ‘socialism’ and ‘collectivism’ and
were committed to developing an agenda that differentiated itself from
classical liberalism.27 Beyond this, however, there were wide varia-
tions in the philosophy as well as in its applications. The previously
mentioned books of the (later) ‘gurus’ of neo-liberalism, Hayek and
24 See discussions in Gamble and Schmidt and Woll, both in this volume.
25 See Amable 2011. See also Gamble and Schmidt and Woll, both in this volume.
26 See Plehwe 2009 and Harvey 2005: 20–22. 27 See Plehwe 2009: 5–6.
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Friedman, were ideological tracts, not scholarly works.28 Moreover,
after 1945, ideas of freer markets and limited states were outliers
in the ‘embedded liberalism’, dominated by the rebuilding of war-
torn economies through planning, the implementation of Keynesian
demand management, and the creation of wider welfare states.29 Only
in Germany did ordo-liberalism occupy a mainstream position in eco-
nomic thinking; but, even there, by the late 1950s, it had been com-
bined with other ideas to form the German model of the ‘social-market
economy’.30
FormostWest European countries, neo-liberal ideas came to the fore
only after the 1970s, with the perceived failure of neo-Keynesianism to
solve the economic crises brought on by the end of the Bretton Woods
system of exchange rates fixed to the dollar and by the two oil shocks
of 1974 and 1979. Policy makers and parts of public opinion became
concerned about governments’ failures to return their countries to eco-
nomic prosperity and their inability to overcome ‘entrenched interests’
in order to reform effectively. Although the movement started in the
1970s, a major shift in the place of neo-liberal ideas began in the
1980s and onwards. The development of those ideas is a complex
phenomenon with important differences by domain and country, as
elaborated in the chapters in this volume. Here, whilst recognizing
that there exist important variations, we outline a somewhat styl-
ized overview of development, building on Ferrera’s suggestion of an
ideational ‘parabola’ (in his case, welfare policy), which is also appar-
ent in the succession of ideas about state reform presented by Schmidt
and Woll.
A first phase saw a more radical variety of neo-liberalism defined
in both its pro-free market and anti-state positions than the
ordo-liberalism in Germany in the 1950s. Its discourse centred on
28 So much so that one critic insisted when Hayek’s book was first published that
it was ‘not scholarship. It is seeing hobgoblins under every bed’. Hansen 1945,
cited in Peck 2010: xii.
29 John Ruggie (1982) used this term to describe postwar political economies that
were liberal in their commitment to markets but ‘embedded’ within the
broader values of a social community.
30 The concept of the social-market economy owes much to the theoretical work
on ordo-liberalism and the ‘competitive market economy’ of Walter Eucken
(1950), begun in the 1930s, in addition to those mentioned previously such as
Erhard, Armack-Mu¨ller, and Ro¨pke. See Lehmbruch 1999 and Ptak 2009; see
also discussions by Gamble and Schmidt and Woll, both in this volume.
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dismantling ‘state intervention’ in markets, particularly with regard to
macroeconomic management of the economy, nationalized industries,
and industrial planning. Its central assumption was that the state’s
main legitimate role was to enforce undistorted competition. It privi-
leged markets over society, epitomized byMargaret Thatcher’s famous
statement, ‘There is no such thing as society. There are individual men
and women, and there are families’.31 This was linked to attacks on the
state that had significant implications for the neo-liberal approach to
questions of social justice and equality, as illustrated by another well-
known Thatcher line about ‘the right to be unequal’.32 These ideas
were strongest in ‘Anglo-Saxon’ countries and taken up by parties of
the political right, notably in the United Kingdom and the United States
by parts of the Republican Party under President Ronald Reagan. Pro-
ponents were mainly inspired by Hayek and Friedman.
In the face of the right’s frequent failures to fulfil their neo-liberal
electoral promises to ‘roll back the state’ in terms of size and regula-
tion, a second phase of neo-liberal renewal ensued, beginning in the
mid to late 1990s, that propounded ideas about the state acting to
make markets more open to competition. This, in turn, ensured that
instead of producing the limited state idealized by some neo-liberal
philosophers, a new synthesis emerged that Schmidt and Woll call
‘liberal neo-statism’. Whereas the ‘liberal’ and ‘neo’ in the term sug-
gest that the state has been transformed in a neo-liberal direction, the
‘statism’ makes clear that the state’s intervention in the markets has
increased. Such ideas were largely generated by centre-left parties but
then taken up by others as well, and they gained ground in Continental
European countries as well as the United Kingdom.
In the current phase, faced with critiques and perceived failures
linked to the economic crises in the 2000s and the many difficulties in
implementing policies that draw on neo-liberal ideas, neo-liberalism
has developed in a variety of ways, depending on domain and coun-
try. One route has been maintenance of the ‘original version’ of neo-
liberalism centred on competitive markets, or the revised ‘second-
phase’ version in which the state’s main function is to promote more
competitive markets while avoiding or reducing collective provision
31 Interview, Women’s Own Magazine, 23 September 1987, published October
1987.
32 See discussion in Schmidt 2002: ch. 6.
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of other services, especially those involved in spending and redistribu-
tion. This second neo-liberal version of the role of the state is seen in
what Mark Thatcher terms ‘supranational neo-liberalism’, in which
EU regulation – whether of financial or product markets – is strong,
extensive, and detailed in the way it acts to ensure competition.33 It
also appears in debates on the European Central Bank (ECB) and the
euro, which are dominated by ‘austerity’, notably with regard to low-
ering state deficits and debt – as it does across the EU member states
but in particular in Britain and Ireland, in Southern Europe, and in
Central and Eastern European countries.34
A second route has seen neo-liberal ideas being combined with rivals
to create a synthesis. In the welfare arena, Ferrera makes clear in his
chapter that (national) state reforms of the welfare state led to a new
synthesis that he characterizes as ‘liberal neo-welfarism’ because neo-
liberal ideas are joined with principles of social justice as the basis for
welfare provision. Similarly, Gerhard Schnyder and Gregory Jackson
find that Sweden and Denmark grafted neo-liberal ideas onto their
social democratic systems, freeing up markets without giving up their
basic values of equality and universalism.
A third route is that neo-liberal labels have been avoided or omitted
even as neo-liberal ideas have been accepted. Thus, in France, the term
‘neo-liberalism’ has been widely rejected even as neo-liberal ideas and
principles remain strong.35
Given its many different interpretations over domain, time, and
place, neo-liberalism is not easily summarized. Nevertheless, it retains a
central core of ideas despite their many permutations. In what follows,
we discuss how to analyse the nature, scope, and limits of neo-liberal
ideas before offering explanations of their resilience.
The resilience of neo-liberal ideas – ideas as objects
of explanation
Ideas in themselves are worthy of explanation. Indeed, after being
strongly focused on interests and institutions, political science is
33 See Thatcher and Mu¨gge, both in this volume.
34 See Jones; Hay and Smith; Gualmini and Schmidt; and Orenstein, all in this
volume.
35 See Gualmini and Schmidt in this volume.
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witnessing an increasing interest in ‘ideas’.36 Similarly – although
systematic analyses of European political economy have tended to
focus on economic logics, institutional-path dependencies, and mate-
rial interests – significant studies are emerging that incorporate ideas.37
Nevertheless, much of the debate about ‘ideas’ in policy making and
in European political economy has centred on whether and how
they influence policy initiatives, policy outcomes, and institutional
development.38
In this book, our purpose is different – it is to study neo-liberal ideas
as part of the policy and political process, especially why they are devel-
oped, adopted, spread, and maintained. Thus, we are concerned with
both the substantive content of ideas and their role in policy debates
and political discourse. Here, we begin by discussing and defining the
meaning of ideational resilience. Thereafter, we discuss the different
forms and levels of neo-liberal ideas. We then conclude this part with
the interactions of the actors who serve as the generators, carriers, and
communicators of such ideas, whether as individuals or as ‘discursive’
communities. Lines of explanation for the resilience of neo-liberal ideas
are developed later in the chapter.
The resilience of neo-liberal ideas
The key theme of this book is that neo-liberal ideas have proven to
be remarkably resilient. They have continued and, indeed, flourished
despite the major challenges that Europe faced in the 2000s. Even
after the crisis of 2007–2008, neo-liberal ideas have come back with a
vengeance within a very short period. Problems of low growth, bank-
ing crises, excessive ‘financialization’, private-sector debt, pressures
on public spending, and tax evasion have been reframed as profligate
governments needing to radically cut their deficits and debt, institute
‘structural reforms’ to radically modify the welfare state, and extend
the ‘rigour’ of competitive markets. Our central question is how and
36 For recent reviews, see, for example, Be´land and Cox 2011; Schmidt 2008,
2010; Campbell 2004; and Blyth 1997.
37 See, for example, Blyth 1997, 2002; Berman 1998; Campbell 1998; Hall 1989;
McNamara 1998; Hay 2001; Schmidt 2000, 2002, 2009; Abdelal et al. 2010;
Cafruny and Ryner 2003; Overbeek and Apeldoorn 2012; Rodrik 2011;
Rothstein 2005; Rosamond 2012; and Woll 2008.
38 For classic general texts, see, for example, Heclo 1974; Goldstein and Keohane
1993 and Baumgartner and Jones 1993.
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why neo-liberal ideas have remained so strong. The puzzle, as Alex
Callinicos states, is why ‘the illusions have survived the bonfire’ and
why the crisis has not ensured – as Joseph Stiglitz had hoped – ‘that
the fall of Wall Street is for market fundamentalism what the fall of
the Berlin Wall was for communism’.39
The ability of neo-liberal ideas to continue, if not flourish, in the
face of internal weaknesses and external challenges is well expressed
through the concept of ‘resilience’. The term has been used increas-
ingly across many disciplines as well as in public discourse. Originally,
it was used mostly in the natural sciences, where its central meaning
concerned the ability of materials to recover their original shape after
a shock rather than breaking; thus, rubber is more resilient than mar-
ble, which is harder but is damaged by external shocks. The term is
now being applied in the social sciences, in domains such as social
and ecological ‘systems’, infrastructure networks, communities facing
health care and other difficulties, national security, and psychology.40
Policy makers are also increasingly utilizing the term, often to refer
to coping with ‘external threats’ such as terrorism and climatic
disasters.
We use the concept of resilience because it conveys key features
about neo-liberalism in recent decades: its adaptation to new circum-
stances so that it ‘bounces back’, its capacity to respond to chal-
lenges, and its ability to change while maintaining key elements so
that the result is continuity in the set of ideas as a whole.41 At the
same time, we recognize that adopting a concept originating in the
natural sciences, in the social sciences, and especially in public policy
runs a number of risks, such as treating resilience as a fixed attribute,
39 See Callinicos 2010: x, and Stiglitz 2008.
40 For a good overview and critiques of use of the term in social sciences, see
MacKinnon and Driscoll Derickson 2012, Norris et al. 2008, and Walker and
Cooper 2011; for social resilience, understood as the ability of members of a
group to respond to challenges (e.g., those arising from neo-liberalism), see
Hall and Lamont 2013. Within the vast literature in psychology, see, for
example, Werner and Smith 1992, 2001; for a review, see Masten, Best, and
Garmezy 1990; or, for a more popular version, see Cyrulnik 2003. In network
regulation, resilience refers to the spare capacity that allows continuation even
if some parts of the system are weakened or stop functioning.
41 In addition, it is noteworthy that Hayek in his later writings uses the concept
of resilience as part of arguments about limits of knowledge regarding how
systems respond to shocks and critiques of assumptions of returns to
equilibrium; see Walker and Cooper 2011.
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importing the hidden assumption of a previous equilibrium, a norma-
tive bias towards the preservation of pre-existing states, and treating
pressures for change as unwelcome ‘external threats’. Most important,
resilience may depoliticize processes whereby social phenomena are
maintained.
To avoid the pitfalls and hidden assumptions in its many different
disciplinary applications, we begin by defining the concept as it is
reflected in ordinary language usage, in terms of the synonyms found in
the dictionary, including flexibility, elasticity, plasticity, adaptability,
and suppleness.We also note that the central definition in social science
is a ‘capacity for successful adaptation in the face of disturbance,
stress, or adversity’.42 When applied to neo-liberalism, however, we
go beyond the identification of these qualities of resilience to place it
explicitly in time, as a process that has taken place over several decades,
with important variations in time, place, and domain. Equally, we
identify key actors involved in creating such resilience to discuss their
interests, views, and interactions, as well as the wider institutional
framework within which they operate. We also discuss both internal
and external pressures on neo-liberalism and give special attention
to the processes or mechanisms that promote resilience, as well as
the feedback effects that serve neo-liberalism through supportive and
reinforcing processes. Finally, we do not view challenges to neo-liberal
ideas as a threat to some form of equilibrium. Rather, we perceive
such ideas and their resilience as part of political processes involving
different aspects of power, such as actor interests and institutions.
Our usage of ‘resilience’ refers to ideational resilience in policy
debates and political discourse. To be more specific, we use the concept
of resilience to refer to neo-liberal ideas continuing to be the ‘preferred’
or assumed ideational approach in public discussions – that is, consid-
ered the ‘usual’, ‘standard’, or ‘conventional’ analytic framework, the
basic set of values or guiding principles, the main policy programme, or
the overarching discourse. Building on analyses of usage in the social
sciences,43 we specify three features of ideational resilience: (1) the
continuity of neo-liberal ideas over time, including their endurance,
recurrence, and adaptability; (2) the dominance of these ideas against
alternatives and competitors; and (3) their survival not only in the face
42 See Norris et al. 2008: 129.
43 See Norris et al. 2008 and Walker and Cooper 2011.
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of strong challenges but also despite their own failures. It is particularly
important to note that resilience incorporates the idea that neo-liberal
ideas face alternatives and are contested and that neo-liberalism
involves adaptation and extension to new spheres.
Neo-liberal resilience as continuity
Continuity can be seen in the endurance or recurrence of core neo-
liberal themes over decades and in their adaptability, as they meet
changing conditions and circumstances. Forms of continuity include
not just straightforward stability but also recurrence when new ver-
sions of old ideas are reintroduced in new times and places. The pro-
cesses that contribute to the continuity of neo-liberal ideas (running
in parallel or inspired by work on institutions) include ‘bricolage’,44
‘conversion’,45 diffusion, and translation.46
When applied to ideational continuity, bricolage involves new ele-
ments being grafted onto older ideas. One major instance is the equa-
tion of the state’s finances to those of households and the conviction
that the state should avoid long-term budget deficits and hold down
public debt, if necessary, by engaging in austerity, even in times of
low growth.47 Conversion sees old ideas being used in new ways. It
helps to describe, for example, the shift in this recurring theme from
the 1920s, when reduction of state spending was framed as protecting
money as a ‘store of value’, to when it returned as ‘austerity’ to prevent
inflation and arguments about ‘no bailouts’ and sustainable debt in the
Eurozone.48
Diffusion involves the spread of neo-liberal ideas, whereas trans-
lation means the adaptation of such ideas to new contexts. Both
lead to the integration into local philosophies of neo-liberal principles
developed elsewhere. One example of diffusion and translation is the
movement of neo-liberal ideas from countries that fully embraced neo-
liberalism to those that did so only partially. Thus, in Germany and
Sweden, even though neo-liberalism conflicted with traditional social-
democratic and corporatist ideas, some key neo-liberal principles (e.g.,
use of markets to allocate resources or competition) were adopted
from elsewhere, translated into more nationally relevant terms, and
44 See Swidler 1986; Campbell 2004: 69–74; and Carstensen 2012.
45 See Streeck and Thelen 2005. 46 See Campbell 2004: 77–85.
47 See Gamble in this volume. 48 See Jones in this volume.
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then integrated with these traditional ideas. The results were a recast-
ing or renewal of social-democratic ideas with new neo-liberal ele-
ments, making for hybrids of ‘corporatist-managed liberalization’ in
which ‘social partners’ are important participants with management
in ensuring firms’ international competitiveness.49
Neo-liberal resilience as dominance
The second element of neo-liberal ideational resilience is dominance
in debates such that it tends to crowd out other ideas, both in existing
domains in which it predominates and in new domains. Such dom-
inance, first and foremost, takes the form of ‘hegemony’, in which
certain core beliefs structure debates in the policy and/or the political
spheres – whether we use the language of Gramsci or of paradigms
to elucidate this.50 One such hegemonic or paradigmatic belief is the
beneficial nature of competition – observed in fields as diverse as reg-
ulation of commercial markets, banking, and welfare provision – with
the concomitant need to reduce ‘barriers’ to competition in all domains
while disregarding any damaging effects.51 Another such belief is that
the state is inherently less efficient than the private sector and that,
although necessary for markets, it is always prone to failure and unjus-
tified expansion.52
A second form of dominance is neo-liberalism’s powerful capacity to
disseminate its principles widely to new domains or places. Thus, for
instance, at the EU level, neo-liberal ideas of the value of competition
have grown from a primary focus on economic markets to areas that
were traditionally the preserve of state monopolies designed to pro-
vide ‘public services’, such as telecommunications, energy, postal ser-
vices, and railways.53 Similarly, neo-liberal arguments about the dan-
gers of state intervention that were originally focused mainly on state
planning and industrial policy have extended into areas such as regu-
lating financial markets.54
49 See Schnyder and Jackson in this volume.
50 On hegemony, see the many works that build on Gramsci, including Laclau
and Mouffe 1985; Overbeek and Apeldoorn 2012: 4–5; and Apeldoorn,
Drahokoupil, and Horn 2008.
51 See Ferrera, Mu¨gge, and Thatcher, all in this volume.
52 See Schmidt and Woll, Vitols, and Hay and Smith, all in this volume.
53 See Thatcher 2007 and in this volume.
54 See Mu¨gge in this volume.
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Ideational dominance also involves the exclusion of alternative ideas
as illegitimate, whether on normative grounds regarding their inappro-
priateness or on cognitive grounds because of their lack of ‘practicabil-
ity’. For example, in corporate governance, ideas of ‘shareholder value’
that originally sat alongside other principles such as stakeholder value
gradually came to dominate thinking at the EU level, as the latter came
to be increasingly portrayed as impracticable.55 Exclusion of alterna-
tive ideas, even if regularly used in the past, has been evenmore marked
in monetary policy, from monetary financing of state budget deficits
to takeover of failing banks or providing deposit guarantees. Such
exclusions have been justified by invoking supposed legal constraints
or shared ideational frameworks, which Jones (in this volume) labels
the Brussels–Frankfurt consensus.
Neo-liberal resilience as survival
‘Resilience’ does not mean that neo-liberal ideas remain uncontested.
On the contrary, the term also signifies the capacity to fend off actual or
potential ideational competitors, even when they appear equally if not
more successful in practice. One such alternative was represented by
the postwar period of Christian and Social Democracy, which offered
the ‘glorious thirty years’ of industrial development and the ‘golden
years’ of the welfare state, in which European economies guided by
ideas of cooperation, corporatism, and/or statism operated successfully
within an overall international regime of ‘embedded liberalism’.56
In the ‘battle of ideas’, neo-liberalism also faced alternative
paradigms and frameworks that traditionally have been powerful in
Europe – notably Marxism and Socialism as well as Christian and
Social Democracy.57 Neo-liberalism has additionally been confronted
with strong resistance in particular countries, whether those marked by
statist traditions such as France, which resisted neo-liberal rhetoric,58
or corporatist or ‘coordinated market economies’, which provided a
different view of how markets could be structured and operated.59
Although these alternatives also may have been weakened in the
55 See Vitols in this volume.
56 See Ruggie 1982, Shonfield 1965, and Katzenstein 1978.
57 Cf. Helleiner 2003 and Blyth 2002.
58 See Gualmini and Schmidt in this volume; see also Schmidt 2002, 2009, and
Fioretos 2011.
59 See Lehmbruch and Schmitter 1982 and Hall and Soskice 2001.
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1980s and 1990s, they have remained.60 In the 2000s, moreover, pol-
icy makers, academics, and commentators sometimes drew on these
diverse approaches to attack neo-liberalism, in particular using the
example of the economic successes of countries farthest away from
neo-liberalism – not only the Nordic countries with their continu-
ing social-democratic traditions but also Germany, whose coordinated
market economy suffered less from the housing boom and subsequent
bust and which recovered much more strongly than, for instance, the
more neo-liberal United Kingdom.
Yet, despite the challenges, neo-liberalism has not simply survived,
it has also renewed its ideas on a continual basis so as to become and
remain dominant. That dominance has ensured that it has come to
define the terms of discussion and contestation. Such resilience can be
seen as all the more remarkable given the challenges resulting from
neo-liberalism’s own apparent failures. European countries that since
the 1980s drew on neo-liberal ideas for policy reforms – such as
public-spending constraints, privatization, liberalization of markets;
and regulatory, labour, and welfare reforms – have (in diverse mea-
sure) suffered from economic problems: high unemployment, low or
at least uneven growth, increasing inequalities, and rising poverty.
They have also experienced major market booms and busts on a reg-
ular basis. The most recent crisis alone would have been expected
to call neo-liberal ideas into serious question. The experiences since
the 1980s make the period of Social and Christian Democrat, corpo-
ratist, and socialist idea(l)s of the 1950s and 1960s appear as a lost
halcyon period compared with the period since the 1980s. Even the
much-maligned 1970s are attractive for many in terms of economic
prosperity. Yet, despite a brief moment of apparent retreat in 2008–
2009, neo-liberal ideas have not succumbed or been replaced with
alternatives.
Forms and levels of neo-liberal ideas
Analysis of neo-liberalism’s ideational resilience can also benefit from
a consideration of the variety of forms at different levels of generality
in which neo-liberal ideas are cast. They may appear as ideologies or
as frames of reference that set an all-encompassing perspective, narra-
tives about why new policies are necessary and appropriate, problem
60 Cf. Hancke´, Rhodes, and Thatcher 2007.
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definitions that frame issues and create shared meaning, or as strategic
weapons in the battle for control. They may also be institutionalized
through formal powers, norms, and objectives of organizations, as
the informal rules and everyday practices of ordinary people; or they
may be embedded in the political and moral vocabulary used in the
discussion of market and state problems.
The multiple forms of neo-liberalism make the concept difficult to
capture fully. This may well be an inherent part of its nature and an
explanation for its resilience, which we explore under the five lines of
analysis discussed herein. For now, we seek to create aminimumdegree
of order by drawing on the literature about typologies of ideas. This
offers many categorizations, but a key common element is that ideas
arise at different levels of generality. We distinguish three: philosoph-
ical principles or worldviews, programmatic ideas, and specific policy
ideas and proposals. This may be important both for understanding
neo-liberalism and for explaining its resilience because different levels
of generality can experience diverse potential trajectories of persistence
or change.
At their most general level, neo-liberal ideas constitute philosophical
principles that may be embodied in worldviews, ideologies, normative
values, or discourses about how markets and states work and what
is therefore appropriate political economic action in the world. These
may be seen as a set of philosophical ideas or ‘discourse’ united by
a core set of values focused on individualism, free markets, and a
strong but limited state; or the worldview of the followers of Friedrich
Hayek, as Gamble elaborates in his chapter; or as an ideology that
combines philosophy with a political programme, as Ferrera argues
in his chapter. These types of philosophical ideas are often at such
a deep level that they can become taken-for-granted ideas that are
not even questioned. This is how Foucault’s (2004) exploration of the
overarching ordo-liberal discourse of the state can prove useful for
understanding how such a philosophy could be the unquestioned and
almost unquestionable approach to economic policy in Germany from
the 1950s onwards.61
At an intermediate level, we find programmatic ideas represented by
neo-liberal problem definitions or analytical frameworks that define
61 See Foucault 2004.
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what types of actions states and markets can or should undertake.
Such programmatic ideas can be highly influential in limiting policy
debates and alternatives because they tend to set the definitions, goals,
objectives, and instruments for economic growth, as Hay and Smith
outlined for the Anglo-liberal growth model and as Thatcher has done
for the ‘regulatory model’ of the EU Commission.
Finally, at the most immediate level, we find the policy ideas con-
tained in the neo-liberal policy proposals, aims, and political discourse
applied to particular situations. These may be highly specific and lim-
ited, concerning individual policies or even policy instruments. They
may be grafted onto different types of policy programmes, regardless of
their underlying philosophy. One illustration of this is what happened
during the Eurozone crisis, in which new policy ideas in response to
the crisis often violated the policy programme and even the underlying
philosophy of the Brussels–Frankfurt consensus, as Jones notes in his
chapter.
Many theories suggest that philosophical ideas generally persist over
long periods. Programmatic ideas tend not to have as much staying
power but are more lasting than policy ideas – which are open to
more rapid shifts because they may be compatible with many different
wider programmes and philosophies. Thereafter, the speed and nature
of ideational change are a matter for debate. One view is that change
in paradigms is rare but, when it occurs, it happens comprehensively
at moments of crisis with systemic ideational shifts, as in Kuhn’s view
of change from one incommensurable paradigm to another.62 Another
view is that change in paradigms or programmes is rare but, when
it occurs, it happens slowly in a dialectical process of market ‘move-
ment’ and social ‘counter-movement’,63 producing what Blyth called
a moment of ‘Great Transformation’.64 A third view is that change
is gradual and evolutionary, the result of incremental processes and
discursive struggles among elites.
Our expectation is that a close fit among rates of change across
the three levels of ideas should not be assumed given the multiple
forms and levels of neo-liberal ideas. Indeed, our chapters sometimes
indicate significant contrasts in the resilience of neo-liberalism across
the three levels. Thus, for instance, policy programmes can change even
62 See Kuhn 1970. 63 See Polanyi 1945. 64 See Blyth 2002: 34–44.
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as the underlying philosophy remains the same, as in the progression
from the conservatives’ 1980s neo-liberal programme of state roll-
back to the Social Democrats’ 1990s neo-liberal programme of state
roll-out, as discussed by Schmidt and Woll in their chapter. Equally,
whatever their philosophical or programmatic ideas, policy makers
have sometimes adopted rather different specific policy ideas, such
as those concerning ‘unorthodox’ monetary instruments by the ECB
after the 2010 state-debt crisis. Conversely, philosophical ideas can
return again and again, albeit pursued through new instruments and
in different guises or disguises. One example is the idea of ‘sound
finances’, or the metaphor in which state finances are treated as the
same as those of private households, as Gamble discusses in his chapter.
Thus, changes at one level of neo-liberal ideas can be compatible or
even aid resilience at another.
Agents of neo-liberalism
Understanding the resilience of neo-liberal ideas also involves iden-
tifying the ideational agents – the actors who not only implement
these ideas but also construct and reconstruct them. The relationship
between agents and ideas is closely linked to wider debates between
positivists and constructivists about the role of ideas.65 At the positivist
end of the continuum, neo-liberal ideas may be cast primarily as legit-
imating devices for interests, with analysis focused on how and why
actors are able to apply neo-liberal ideas in pursuit of their goals. At
the constructivist end of the continuum, neo-liberal ideas have central
roles in policy making, including strategic ideas that serve as guiding
frameworks, as ‘paradigms’ that set the frame for understanding, or as
‘weapons’ in the battle of ideas. Whereas positivists examine actors’
strategic use of ideas, constructivists perceive ideas as constitutive,
shaping agents’ definitions of their interests.
We do not take a stand in the positivist–constructivist debate. One
reason is that contributors offer evidence that draws on both views of
ideas and the supposed conflict between the two extremes is rarely
seen empirically. Neo-liberal ideas can serve the (perceived) inter-
ests of major actors such as the European Commission, political and
65 For different views see for example Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Jobert 1989;
Onuf 1989; Hall 1993; Wendt 1999; Blyth 2002; Schmidt 2002, 2008;
Abdelal, Blyth, and Parsons 2010.
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economic leaders, and financial firms and regulators.66 They can
shape actors’ problem definitions and views of what are ‘acceptable’
solutions.67 Moreover, they can frame the understandings of political
leaders at both national and EU levels, as ideas about the virtues of
competition, reduced state spending or the lack of alternative policies
become articles of faith unquestioned even in the midst of crisis.68
Regardless of positions taken in the positivist–constructivist debate,
our contributors’ analyses of neo-liberalism all serve to identify the
agents of resilience, who spread, develop, and sustain neo-liberal
ideas through interactive processes of communication.69 Such agents
can be considered ‘ideational entrepreneurs’, whether the ‘policy
entrepreneurs’ or ‘mediators’ of the comparative policy and politi-
cal economy literature70 or the ‘norm entrepreneurs’ of international
relations.71 Although they are mostly depicted as elites making top-
down policy, such entrepreneurs can also be cast as activists in social
movements with bottom-up policy effects.72 Among elite ideational
entrepreneurs, we can identify three general types – ideological, prag-
matic, and opportunistic – classifiable according to how, why, and to
what extent they took up and/or stayed with neo-liberal ideas.73 Each
played a part in the rise of neo-liberalism.
Ideological entrepreneurs can be seen as primemovers for neo-liberal
reform, offering a set of overarching philosophical ideas that inform
their policy programmes and ideas. These can be political leaders but
also intellectuals, such as the economists, philosophers, and histori-
ans who developed the ideas for neo-liberalism in the 1930s and
66 See Thatcher, Mu¨gge, Vitols, and Orenstein, in this volume.
67 See Jones and Mu¨gge, this volume.
68 See Thatcher, Gamble, and Schmidt and Woll, in this volume; see also Bermeo
and Pontusson 2012.
69 See, for example, Habermas 1996; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Haas
1992; Schmidt 2000, 2002, 2008; and Campbell 2004.
70 See, for example, Fligstein and Mara-Drita 1996; Jobert 1989; and Muller
1995.
71 See, for example, Finnimore and Sikkink 1998.
72 See Keck and Sikkink 1998 and Epstein 2008. See also discussion in Schmidt
2008.
73 Mahoney and Thelen 2009 use a similar set of actor categories but define them
in terms of what they have accomplished, as befits historical institutionalist
explanation. This categorization differs somewhat because these actors are
defined by their beliefs in the ideas they promote and their discourse about
them, whether or not they later may compromise those ideas in action.
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then in the 1950s. They have also been technocratic elites, such as
unelected officials in central banks or regulatory organizations such
as the ECB or the Commission.74 Pragmatic actors, in contrast, tend
to be ‘bricoleurs’, cobbling ideas together, without a doctrinaire com-
mitment to an underlying philosophy.75 Thus, with regard to neo-
liberalism, examples include leaders of the centre-left in the late 1990s,
such as Blair and Schro¨der, who often sought to merge neo-liberal
ideas with social-democratic ideas. Finally, opportunistic ideational
entrepreneurs such as Berlusconi or Sarkozy have used neo-liberal
ideas (often temporarily) with little commitment but solely to gain
political power.76
Neo-liberal ideas have also been developed and spread by agents
outside the direct policy sphere. Such agents may be organized in
‘epistemic communities’77 or ‘discourse coalitions’78 of loosely con-
nected, like-minded converts who operate in academe, think tanks,
and professional networks, disseminating their ideas without neces-
sarily having a direct or immediate impact on the policy-making pro-
cess. Certainly, this describes the intellectual leaders of the neo-liberal
movement who operated initially through the Mont Pe`lerin Society’s
‘thought collective’ of like-minded individuals and who – even if they
disagreed on specific questions – shared enough in terms of values
and principled beliefs to jointly develop and widely disseminate the
results of their neo-liberal thinking.79 However, these individuals may
also be part of ‘advocacy coalitions’80 in their own countries, as mem-
bers of think tanks, as public intellectuals, and as academics they
can join with policy makers or themselves become government offi-
cials and even leaders, as in the cases of Ludwig Erhard and Luigi
Einaudi.81
Economists and other types of experts have been at the forefront
of the generation and promulgation of neo-liberal ideas, in particular
74 Cf. Mu¨gge 2011.
75 See Carstensen 2011; cf. also Mu¨gge 2011. For the sociological foundations of
the term bricolage, see Swidler 1986; Campbell 2004; and Fourcade and
Savelsberg 2006.
76 See Gualmini and Schmidt in this volume. 77 See Haas 1992.
78 See Wittrock, Wagner, and Wollman 1991; and Hajer 1993.
79 See Fleck 1980 and Plehwe 2009: 35; see also Plehwe, Walpen, and
Neunho¨ffer 2006.
80 See Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993. 81 See Blyth 2013.
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through ‘knowledge regimes’ in different national contexts.82 They are
important not only in generating neo-liberal ideas and in advising gov-
ernments – as in the role of neo-liberal economists in recommending
the mass privatization programmes in Central and Eastern Europe83 –
but also in implementing those ideas as heads of major national
institutions (e.g., national central banks and finance ministries) or of
supranational ones (e.g., the ECB, the EU Commission, and the Inter-
national Monetary Fund [IMF]). Additionally, they are instrumental in
training new generations of economists who then put their ideas into
practice once they gain positions of power and authority.84 Scholars
have also shown that economists embed neo-liberal presuppositions in
the very instruments and analytic tools that have increasingly come to
be accepted not only by the players in the markets – whose financial
models reshape rather than simply reflect the markets – but equally
by the administrators of the state.85 Indeed, in economic sociology,
Jens Beckert’s (2011) has developed the concept of ‘fictionality’ which
suggests instead of being economically ‘rational’, economists and mar-
ket actors elaborate ‘imagined futures’ about what might happen and
then organize their activities based on such ‘mental representations’.
Here, through their effects on actors’ expectations, neo-liberal ideas
contribute to the constitution of markets.
Explaining resilience: Five lines of analysis
So how do we explain this resilience of neo-liberal ideas? We offer
five possible lines of analysis, linked to wider theories about politi-
cal economy and ideas. The first line of explanation is about the core
principles and values of neo-liberal ideas, which provide it with a high
degree of malleability or plasticity. As a result, when neo-liberal ideas
are faced with internal and external difficulties, they can readily adapt
and reshape themselves via processes of metamorphosis, absorption, or
hybridization. The second concerns gaps between neo-liberal rhetoric
and the realities of its policies in practice. Paradoxically, such gaps
82 See, for example, Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002; and Campbell and
Pedersen 2010.
83 See Orenstein in this volume.
84 See, for example, Fourcade 2009; Mandelkern and Shalev 2010; and Ban 2012.
85 See Mackenzie 2006 and Mackenzie et al. 2007.
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can actually be helpful to neo-liberal ideational entrepreneurs, allow-
ing ideologues to continue to promote it as a set of principles and
values even (or perhaps especially) if its detailed policy programme
has been subject to compromise by the pragmatists or abandoned by
opportunists because of problems with the policies. A third line of
explanation focuses on discourse. This suggests that in the commu-
nication of the ideas, neo-liberal ideas can prove stronger in policy
debates than rivals, whether as a result of the seeming coherence of the
ideas, how they are framed, or how they are communicated.
The first three lines of analysis thus concern the nature of neo-
liberalism itself as a set of ideas; the final two concern the wider context
within which such ideas are set. The fourth line of explanation is about
the power of interests – in the sense of self-interested agents who gain
from neo-liberal ideas. The fifth line of analysis concerns the force of
institutions, examining how institutional frameworks aid and support
neo-liberalism while hindering alternative ideas in ways explicable by
reference to different neo-institutionalisms.
In this section, we discuss the nature of the explanation offered by
each line of analysis and then its possible mechanisms and processes.
The concluding chapter examines how these five explanations have
played out in practice, with examples from the different empirical
chapters.
We see the five lines as distinct but complementary lines of inquiry.
It is crucial to emphasize that we do not seek to explain whether and
why policies are neo-liberal in their impact. Rather, we confine our
task to exploring the resilience of neo-liberal political economic ideas
as ideas – in their different forms and at their different levels, from gen-
eral worldviews and values to paradigms, to specific policy proposals as
they change or continue over time. In so doing, we also include the con-
flicts or contradictions in ideational processes both internal and exter-
nal to neo-liberalism because, as discussed previously, we do not see it a
single, coherent set of ideas. Indeed, we find that, apparent weaknesses
or imbalances are often turned to neo-liberalism’s advantage.
Neo-liberalism’s ideational generality, diversity, and mutability
Neo-liberal ideas are often highly general and amorphous. They appear
to contain conflicting or even contradictory concepts that shift over
time, policy domains, or context. Thus, neo-liberal positions over the
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state, regulation, welfare, or active labour-market policies have evolved
from seeking state ‘retreat’ to advocating new forms of state action to
aid or enhance markets. Moreover, many of neo-liberalism’s central
ideas, especially at the level of specific policy proposals, have suf-
fered drubbings when subjected to rigorous scrutiny and investigated
in detail – from workfare policies to the drive for ‘competitiveness’ in
healthcare systems, or from introducing competition in network indus-
tries such as rail transportation to ‘light-touch’ regulation in the finance
markets.86 Few policy makers accept the appellation because it often
has negative connotations, especially in Europe. Indeed, for some, ‘the
neo-liberal label has become part of political rhetoric, albeit as an
almost meaningless insult’.87
Although such criticisms of neo-liberalism as an analytical concept
may be valid, they miss a key point: as a political attribute, generality,
diversity, and mutability are some of neo-liberalism’s strongest suits.
Neo-liberalism can be viewed as a core set of first principles rather
than as a specific and falsifiable set of positive theories or doctrines or
proposals. The resilience of neo-liberalism benefits from its core prin-
ciples over time as well as in their openness to diverse interpretation
and application.88 The very generality and plasticity of neo-liberalism,
which make the concept seemingly amorphous and difficult to define
precisely, are key reasons for its resilience.
This explanation suggests that the high level of generality of neo-
liberalism’s first principles focused on competitive markets and a lim-
ited state, combined with their great malleability, enable it to undergo
many different permutations, not only to survive but also to dominate.
This includes progressing from hostility against the state to the desire
for a strong state, from highly permissive neo-liberal ‘deregulation’ to
‘ordo-liberal’ restrictive re-regulation, from passive reduction of social
spending and job protections to active use of welfare to promote mar-
ket efficiency via ‘active labour-market policy’. Equally, the avoidance
of the neo-liberal appellation increases the difficulty for its opponents
to identify their object of attack, while permitting the adoption (in
many diverse forms and to different extents) of its ideas by a var-
ied range of political actors – from Berlusconi to Blair, from British
86 For academic critiques across several economic domains, see, for example,
Crouch 2011 and Harvey 2005.
87 See Hartwich 2009. 88 See Brenner, Peck, and Theodore 2010.
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Conservatives to Scandinavian Social Democrats, from campaigners
against state ‘interference’ to national and European officials and reg-
ulators.
Far from being a weakness, internal theoretical contradictions and
external political conflicts may fuel the growth of neo-liberalism. They
produce a highly adaptable set of ideas, able to survive hostile climates
and external challenges. We could even say that they offer a large menu
of choices of ideas and proposals according to tastes.
Neo-liberalism’s generality and breadth may contribute to its
resilience through several mechanisms and processes. One mecha-
nism is metamorphosis. Constantly shifting policy ideas not only allow
neo-liberalism to grow, develop, and spread but also permit its rela-
belling so that past ideas return in new (dis)guises. Metamorphosis
permits the proponents of neo-liberal ideas to evade paying the price
of past scrutiny, as ideas that were discredited in previous periods
recur, returning in new guises. Examples abound, such as the 1920s
discourse of ‘sound money’ reappearing in the 1970s as monetarism
and in the late 2000s as ‘sustainable debt’. As such, neo-liberalism can
be likened to the hydra with many heads of Greek mythology: cut off
one head and two pop back up.
Absorption is a second mechanism. As tensions and even contradic-
tions multiply among neo-liberalism’s different philosophical princi-
ples and theories or among its principles and more specific policy pro-
grammes and ideas, so its loose and flexible framework may develop
by absorbing other ideas, changing labels, and extending its scope. The
reform of the welfare system is a case in point, when different social
democratic elements were incorporated in neo-liberal initiatives, par-
ticularly beginning in the 1990s.
A third mechanism is hybridization. In this case, instead of ‘a fight to
the finish’ with apparent ideational competitors, neo-liberal principles
are often ‘married’ to them to produce new versions and hybrids of
neo-liberalism. This was mostly the case for countries with strong
corporatist labour–management relations. All three mechanisms attest
to the mutability of neo-liberal ideas as they undergo metamorphoses,
absorb other ideas, or combine with yet others.
The nature of neo-liberalism as an overall orientation suggests that
high generality, lack of internal coherence, and conceptual ‘fuzzi-
ness’ may be advantageous for ideational resilience. However, the
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explanation also requires identification of political processes and
actors, as well as the context within which they operate. Hence, it
invites consideration of other explanatory factors, such as how the
generality and breadth of neo-liberalism relates to policies, rival ideas
and discourses, interests, and institutions.
Neo-liberal rhetoric versus reality or the benefits of
non-implementation
Neo-liberalism has faced wide gaps between its rhetoric and the reality
of its policies in practice. Already in the 1980s and 1990s, the soaring
claims of ‘rolling back the state’ and ‘deregulation’ made by politicians
such as Thatcher and Reagan turned out to be hollow in practice. But
gaps seemed to increase with the 2007–2008 crisis. Thus, assertions
about allocation through ‘efficient markets’ as opposed to the ‘ineffi-
cient state’ faced the reality of disastrous private-market decisions and
state bailouts of large companies, including large financial institutions
who had been the beacons of private markets. Equally, the rhetoric of
‘cutting back the state’ contrasts with increases in state size and mar-
ket involvement after 2007–2008 due to ‘stimulus’ packages, increased
welfare spending, and state aids. Finally, far from being seen as most
successful, the most avowed ‘neo-liberal’ countries in Europe – notably
the United Kingdom and Ireland – experienced sharp recessions after
2007–2008 and relative failure compared with countries that were
more reticent about neo-liberalism, such as Germany and Sweden.
Such gaps between the rhetoric and a different reality might have
been expected to weaken neo-liberalism; however, their continued
reappearance suggests the opposite. Hence, this second line of analy-
sis offers what may seem to be a paradoxical explanation: instead of
undermining neo-liberalism, the gap between neo-liberal rhetoric and
the implementation of those ideas actually aids resilience.
Different mechanisms for this second explanation can be hypoth-
esized. First, neo-liberalism may be closer to a religion or ideol-
ogy than to a practical set of policies. Proponents of neo-liberalism,
in other words, may believe fervently in certain basic philosophical
ideas on which they base their programmatic ideas, regardless of the
practicability.Moreover, because these are normative philosophies and
not positive theories that might be falsified by contrary observations,
30 Theorizing ideational continuity
proponents are likely to conclude – if implementation fails – that com-
pliance was insufficient rather than that the theory was wrong. The
result is pressure for more neo-liberalism, not less, as in the Eurozone
crisis, in which the demands from Northern Europeans included tight-
ened enforcement and punishment of the ‘sinners’ to the detriment of
their economies.89
Alternatively, proponents can be opportunistic leaders, who adopt
the policies only to win elections before then abandoning them when
they prove too controversial or unpopular. French Prime Minister
Chirac in the mid 1980s and Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi in
the early 2000s are examples.90 Furthermore, proponents can be prag-
matic ideational entrepreneurs, willing to compromise in order to push
through at least some elements of their programme, as in the case of
Prime Ministers Tony Blair in the United Kingdom and Mario Monti
in Italy.91 In any of these four cases, lack of implementation could
be used to reinforce the argument that more neo-liberalism is needed,
based on a view that its proponents were inadequate (i.e., the ideolog-
ical entrepreneurs) or betrayed the cause (i.e., the opportunistic and
pragmatic entrepreneurs).
More generally, lack of implementation allows neo-liberal support-
ers to claim that their policies have never actually been tested in prac-
tice and protects them from blame for specific policy failures. This is
significant because many neo-liberal policies – such as cutting pub-
lic spending, reforming welfare, and reducing regulatory protection –
are difficult to implement and extremely unpopular politically. At
the same time, lack of implementation can preserve neo-liberalism’s
apparent political ‘virginity’.
The implementation gap may even directly benefit neo-liberal sup-
porters, notably in political arenas. It can divert attention from the
messy difficulties of policy making, pointing to the ‘sunny uplands’ of
the future. It can also provide supporters with a simple (or even sim-
plistic) ‘poster child’ with which to contrast alternatives, which can be
painted as failed, corrupt, and old-fashioned. Indeed, the rhetoric of
neo-liberalism may be precisely designed not for implementation but
89 Our thanks go to Fritz Scharpf for this insight. See also Jones in this volume
and Scharpf 2012.
90 See Gualmini and Schmidt in this volume.
91 See discussion in Schmidt and Woll in this volume.
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rather to alter the terms of political debate in ways that advantage
its supporters and disadvantage its opponents – notably, carriers of
alternative ideas.
This line of analysis underlines the political nature of neo-liberalism
and the ways in which ‘policy’ may be subordinate to ‘politics’. How-
ever, it then points to other questions: Why is neo-liberalism an attrac-
tive option for offering impracticable ideas? Why is neo-liberalism not
replaced with other ideas that are practicable? Which actors press for
neo-liberal ideas and how do they benefit from them? How are neo-
liberal myths sustained over time?
The strength of neo-liberal ideas and discourse in
policy and politics
A third line of explanation lies in the strength of neo-liberal ideas
in policy debates and political discourse. For academics, who view
neo-liberal ideas as highly flawed and neo-liberal discourse as mere
rhetoric, it may seem surprising (if not painful) to think them worthy
of serious consideration. However, we are concerned here with how
ideas are developed, perceived, communicated, and received in the
policy arena and the political sphere – not which are academically
strong. Moreover, strength is relative. Despite the problems of neo-
liberal ideas, critiques may have been limited and alternatives even
weaker, at least in policy debates.92
This explanation lies in the realm of the production and development
of ideas, as well as in their dissemination through discourse.93 It thus
takes ideas and discourse as the explanatory variable for their own
resilience – they are not reduced to the effects of other factors.94 It
differs from the first explanation in that neo-liberal ideas here remain
resilient by winning in the ‘battle of ideas’, in ‘discursive struggles’
against opposing alternatives, and even in the deliberative processes of
argument and persuasion.
Onemechanism bywhich neo-liberal ideaswin over alternativesmay
arise from the content of the ideas themselves and the completeness
of their seeming answers to current problems in both cognitive and
92 Cf. Peck, Theodore, and Brenner 2009: 103.
93 Cf. Blyth 2002, Hay 2001, and Schmidt 2008. 94 Cf. Blyth 2002.
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normative terms. Neo-liberal ideas may offer (or appear to offer) a
more coherent account of the usefulness and necessity of their proposed
initiatives than rivals such as Social or Christian Democracy, given
new constraints, especially international constraints including global
competition, large capital markets, and massive cross-border financial
and other flows. Similarly, the neo-liberal discourse that promises to
rein in spending, with appeals to the ‘virtue’ of sound finances using
the metaphor of the household economy, may resonate better with
ordinary citizens than the Keynesian counterintuitive proposition to
spend more at a time of high deficits and debts.
A second mechanism is related to how neo-liberal ideational
entrepreneurs use their ideas to ‘frame’ current problems,95 offer-
ing a ‘re´ferentiel’, or frame of analysis, through which to interpret
events96 and developing narratives and storylines to weave together
policy prescriptions, policy programmes, and philosophical principles
into a seemingly coherent account of what happened and why. They
may additionally create metaphors, myths, and symbols to bolster their
message. Here, self-reinforcement also occurs as subsequent events are
interpreted through neo-liberal lenses. Thus, for example, even appar-
ent failures of neo-liberal inspired policies (e.g., recession arising from
austerity) become lessons in the importance of avoiding ‘excessive’
state spending.
Framing can be linked to a third and often powerful mechanism:
political discourse that successfully communicates neo-liberal policy
ideas while crowding out or disadvantaging alternatives. Neo-liberal
ideational entrepreneurs widely disseminated their ideas. This hap-
pened first in the ‘coordinative discourse’ among policy actors, as
neo-liberal ideas were generated by think tanks or thought collectives
(e.g., the Institute of Economic Affairs in Britain and the Mont Pe`lerin
Society).97 They were then circulated by elite ‘epistemic communities’,
promoted by politically connected ‘advocacy coalitions’, and adopted
by powerful ideational entrepreneurs – who translated and commu-
nicated them into language accessible to the public. Many neo-liberal
ideas are are highly suitable for this ‘communicative discourse’ through
which ideas are conveyed to the public: they are easy to understand
95 See Rein and Scho¨n 1994. 96 See Jobert and Muller 1987 and Muller 1995.
97 See, for example, Denham 1996 and Plewhe 2009; on welfare in Britain and
Germany, see Pautz 2012.
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and resonate with ‘common sense’ and with deep values and (inter-
preted) personal experience.98 This makes them easier to communicate
than many rivals and also highly attractive to political parties, com-
mentators, and ‘second-hand dealers’ and ‘bricoleurs’ of ideas, who
can combine them with other concepts or philosophies, from Social
Democracy to statism.99
Neo-liberal ideas also may serve to reconceptualize the interests and
priorities of agents. For example, with regard to labour markets, neo-
liberal ideas challenged the postwar ideal of organization via corpo-
ratist relations between management and unions, with a new frame in
which businesses should determine wages in decentralized labour mar-
kets, whereas labour unions were presented as damaging firms and
the economy. Multinational businesses, in particular, largely recon-
ceptualized their interests in this way, even in corporatist countries,
as they increasingly pressured unions to agree to greater flexibility in
wages and working conditions and governments to legislate ‘structural
reform’.100
The power of interests as the winners from neo-liberalism
Interest-based analyses view ideas as tools wielded by self-interested
actors. In contrast to the third line of explanation, the values and prior-
ities of such actors are not changed by ideas – instead, neo-liberalism
is utilized by actors to achieve their aims. Hence, a fourth line of
explanation is that debates about economic policy have been captured
by powerful interests (a claim made by ‘critical political economists’
in particular).101 Those interests have promoted and sustained neo-
liberal ideas because they gain from them. They are able to prevent
alternatives to neo-liberalism (which exist and may well be stronger
in intellectual and policy terms – in contrast to the third explanation)
from being accepted in policy debates because of their power, whether
economic, institutional, or coercive. This suggests a process whereby
self-interested actors promote neo-liberal ideas that, in turn, produce
98 See Schmidt 2002, 2006, and 2010.
99 See Carstensen 2011 or, for national examples, Schnyder and Jackson, Hay
and Smith, Orenstein, and Gualmini and Schmidt, all in this volume.
100 See Schnyder and Jackson, and Martin, both in this volume.
101 See, for example, Harvey 2005 on the ‘construction of consent’. See also
Overbeek and Apeldoorn 2012.
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policies that enable them to pursue their interests, whether in terms of
political power or material gain. The result is a self-reinforcing process
between ideas and self-interested actors.
An interest-based analysis examines the resources, strategies, and
coalitions of actors in developing and promoting neo-liberal ideas.
Unlike the third line of explanation, ‘interests’ usually refer to coali-
tions of actors. Economic actors – firms, their senior managers, and
their associations, as well as institutional investors – comprise the
most obvious starting point because they are at the heart of neo-
liberalism.102 However, political parties and elected politicians may
also have important roles. Unelected officials are also significant – not
only civil servants but also members of non-majoritarian institutions
that have spread and gained powers in Europe since the 1980s, includ-
ing independent regulatory authorities, the European Commission,
courts, and independent central banks.103 Finally, powerful individ-
uals can also contribute, for example, by forming coalitions that press
for fiscal ‘rigour’, competition, free trade, and other neo-liberal ideas.
This line of explanation suggests that these actors promote neo-
liberal ideas for self-interest. Such actors may benefit materially,
notably through lower taxes (especially on large firms and rich indi-
viduals) or through the new opportunities opened up by ‘deregulation’
and privatization, either through the reduction in constraints on busi-
ness activity or to provide services no longer guaranteed by the state.
In the United States, Hacker and Pierson argue that business inter-
ests in particular have gained in organizational power since the 1980s,
whereas labour and voters have lost, and that they have used this power
to promote the enactment of inequality-enhancing policies as well as
to engineer institutional ‘drift’ through resistance to the updating of
policy, thereby benefitting themselves and the very rich.104 Politicians
also can gain by using neo-liberal ideas to win elections and achieve or
retain political power. Neo-liberal discourse can supply political par-
ties with valuable weapons in elections and in political debate. They
can provide justifications for policies that benefit their supporters and
disadvantage their opponents. Equally, they can provide justification
for additional powers to be transferred to non-majoritarian institutions
in the name of ‘efficiency’ and ‘competition’.
102 Cf. Crouch 2011 and Harvey 2005.
103 Cf. Coen and Thatcher 2005. 104 See Hacker and Pierson 2010.
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There are several mechanisms that link self-interested actors and
support for neo-liberal policy ideas. One mechanism is through such
actors’ production of ideas for both policy agendas and political pro-
grammes. In contrast with our third line of analysis, which focused on
the content, framing, and discursive presentation of ideas, this fourth
line of analysis considers the strategic construction and use of neo-
liberal ideas by self-interested actors, whether or not they believe in
them.
Interests can also create coalitions in support of neo-liberal ideas,
offering a second mechanism for their influence. Here, the causal-
ity suggested in the third explanation is reversed: coalitions promote
ideas rather than ideas acting as ‘glue’ for coalitions. This mechanism
can be observed through evidence such as funding for think tanks or
associations that develop and disseminate neo-liberal ideas.
Finally, communicating and persuading people about (or, in the
cruder language of advertising, ‘selling’) neo-liberal ideas represent a
third mechanism. This highlights the important role not only of politi-
cians in popularizing neo-liberal ideas but also that of the media in
propagating them. The media may have links to pro–neo-liberal inter-
ests, from political parties to firms and individuals, through ownership
ormutually beneficial exchange relationships – as in the cases of Rupert
Murdoch and Silvio Berlusconi.
Feedback mechanisms are also important in this fourth line of anal-
ysis. One feedback process can take the form of policies inspired by
neo-liberalism that increase the power of self-interested actors to fur-
ther promote their self-interest. This has certainly been the case of
deregulatory policy ideas promoted by financial-market actors, who
only became larger and more systemically powerful as those ideas
were implemented (and, in turn, could invest more in lobbying and
promoting neo-liberal ideas).105 A second mechanism builds on the
first because as actors gain in power, they are likely to broaden their
initial coalition. This may be true because others are won over to neo-
liberal ideas, as in the case of European competition policy, or because
‘if they can’t beat them, they join them’, as in the case of the centre-left
accepting neo-liberal ideas in the UK and elsewhere beginning in the
1990s. A third feedback loop is one in which the content of the ideas
105 See Lindblom 1977 and Block 1977.
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(as in the third line of analysis) serves to reinforce the power and inter-
ests of the actors using those ideas for their own strategic purposes.
This may be especially relevant in cases of what Pepper Culpepper
calls ‘quiet politics’, in which business interests enjoy more room for
influence because of the high level of technicality of the policy ideas
under discussion, as in the case of corporate governance.106
However, whatever the mechanisms of support or of feedback, self-
interested actors – along with the ideas they convey – all take place in
given contexts. These contexts – meaning the institutional framework
within which they are played out – are also significant.
The force of institutions as constraints and opportunities
An institutionalist analysis emphasizes how institutions shape the
endurance, dominance, and survival in the face of challenges of neo-
liberal ideas rather than how neo-liberal ideas have influenced institu-
tional formation. Multiple definitions of ‘institutions’ exist; however,
here, we mainly use the term to refer to formal organizations and
formal and informal rules and regularities.107 Hence, the explanation
can point to organizations and formal structures that shape the incen-
tives for actors or that determine the venues for political discourse
and debates, legal rules that influence the choices available, and social
norms that affect which rules are regarded as practicable or legitimate.
One basis for this line of analysis comes from a well-developed lit-
erature that claims that ‘institutions’ are crucial for the spread and
implantation of ideas. Thus, for instance, Peter Hall108 and Margaret
Weir and Theda Skocpol109 argue that the adoption of ideas, whether
major new paradigms such as Keynesianism and monetarism or spe-
cific policy ideas, depends on whether they are ‘congruent’ with exist-
ing institutions – which means the extent to which they are practicable
within existing national institutions and, hence, compatible with the
institutionally shaped interests of key policy actors.110 This offers a
106 See Culpepper 2011.
107 Here, to avoid confusion, we start by restricting our definition to formalized
institutions and rules, as opposed to a more constructivist definition of
institutions, in terms of the meanings they hold for the agents who
constructed them and are structured by them.
108 See Hall 1984, 1986, and 1989. 109 See Weir and Skocpol 1985.
110 However, see the critique by Blyth (2002: 20–27), who argues that this then
cannot explain the spread of transformative ideas.
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powerful explanation for the differential spread and re-interpretation
of ideas across countries, helping to explain why neo-liberalism appar-
ently was adopted more quickly and deeply in the United States and
the United Kingdom than in, for example, France and Sweden.
A separate school of thought, initiated in international relations,
argues that the dissemination of ideas also strongly depends onwhether
they are ‘institutionalized’ through organizational design, aiding in
their persistence.111 For neo-liberalism, this explanation would under-
line the creation and strengthening of organizations that promote
neo-liberal ideas.112 These may be ‘non-majoritarian institutions’ such
as the European Commission, courts, or independent central banks
and regulatory agencies that spread from the 1980s onwards113 but
also new or strengthened private bodies such as credit-rating agencies
or standard-setting bodies that have acquired an important role in
economic markets.114 Certainly, the institutionalization of neo-liberal
ideas in the EU’s highly independent non-majoritarian institutions –
such as the ECB, with the focus of its charter on price inflation,
or the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Competition,
charged to focus on competition – attest to the importance of institu-
tional design.115
Historical institutionalism, moreover, suggests that once ideas are
institutionalized, they represent powerful forces for continuity. This
may occur through the ‘path dependence’ of existing ideas, the con-
straints on innovation, and on alternatives.116 It may also occur
through incremental change that involves keeping existing institutions,
notably via layering of new institutions onto old ones; permitting drift
of present institutions; or conversion of old institutions.117 The suc-
cessive pacts for stability in the Eurozone – beginning with the Sta-
bility and Growth Pact that consecrated the 1990s Maastricht criteria
111 See Goldstein 1993 and Goldstein and Keohane 1993; see also Blyth 2002.
112 This explanation may come close to the fourth one – namely, interests.
However, there are two differences: a historical institutionalist approach
examines changes in organizations as the explanation, whereas an
interest-based approach based in rational-choice institutionalism takes them
as fixed; sociological or historical institutionalist analyses of organizations
treat them as following inherited or given behaviour rather than acting as
rational self-interested actors.
113 See, for example, Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2002.
114 See Kerwer 2005 and Sinclair 2005, 2010. Cf. Bu¨the and Mattli 2011.
115 See Thatcher and Jones, both in this volume. 116 See Pierson 2004.
117 See Streeck and Thelen 2005 and Mahoney and Thelen 2009.
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for monetary union and culminating with various pacts during the
Eurozone crisis – ensure that neo-liberal ideas about fiscal consolida-
tion, regardless of their failure to solve the crisis, have created path
dependence for the rules of EU monetary policy that will be difficult to
reverse.118 Moreover, the heavy investment in ideas about competition
and efficient markets, along with their institutionalization through leg-
islation, constrains the espousal of ideational alternatives that could
be organizationally risky, as indicated by the contortions of the ECB
to justify ‘exceptional measures’ to respond to the crisis.119
Sociological institutionalists go even further, viewing institutions
as also serving to constrain and empower actors.120 Mechanisms
of ideational influence and reproduction result from institutional
isomorphism, whether through mimetism, normative processes, or
coercion.121 Neo-liberal ideas as suchmay be seen as a form of ‘fashion’
to be copied or taken as a ‘recipe’ to be applied, adopted, or adapted
by other countries in a wide range of domains. Institutional actors
such as the IMF, the EU Commission, and the ECB, as well as gov-
ernments in most European countries, have promoted such mimetism
at one time or another. However, they also – often at the same time –
have cast neo-liberal ideas as norms for policies as the only ‘right’
or legitimate thing to do, whether to reform welfare by linking it to
work or by viewing all debt as unsustainable. They have equally used
coercion in imposing neo-liberal ideas as the only ones available –
as in the case of EU and IMF conditionality for Central and Eastern
European countries.122 However, coercion also can come indirectly
from the perceived threats of non-conformity with neo-liberal ideas,
whether from the ‘shadow of the law’ hanging over policy debates in
domains as varied as fiscal policy, regulation, and welfare or from the
‘markets’.
Thus, a fifth explanation for neo-liberal resilience is that, since the
1980s, institutions have come to provide support and opportunities
for neo-liberal ideas while conversely constraining and disadvantag-
ing alternatives. However, the many different ways in which such
institutional resilience operates is more dependent on the theoretical
analysis used than in the other four lines of analysis. Whereas rational-
choice institutionalists will point to how organizations or formal rules
118 See Jones in this volume.
119 See Jones in this volume. 120 See Campbell 2004.
121 See DiMaggio and Powell 1991. 122 See Orenstein in this volume.
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establish the incentives that affect actors’ calculations, thereby con-
straining change and structuring opportunities, historical institution-
alists may focus on either the path-dependent constraints of self-
reinforcing processes or the incremental processes that add oppor-
tunities, even as they constrain the direction of change. In contrast,
sociological institutionalists will look for processes such as mimetism,
normative legitimation, and coercion to emphasize that the resilience
of neo-liberal ideas comes not from superiority in a ‘competition for
ideas’ but instead because of wider legitimation and existing power
structures. Finally, discursive institutionalists will return to the role of
discourse in the embedding of neo-liberal ideas in public debates and
discussions within differing institutional contexts. They may either
underline how discourse relates to the three other institutionalisms or
take a more constructivist approach by emphasizing how institutions
are constructions of meaning, as they structure thought and action.123
Conclusion
The term ‘neo-liberalism’ often evokes powerful reactions from policy
makers and the public in many European countries. Frequently, it is
associated with unpopular policies, such as accepting greater inequal-
ity, imposing market competition, fiscal austerity, and reducing the
welfare state. A (usually smaller) body of opinion disagrees strongly,
viewing neo-liberalism as liberating individuals and firms from the
deadening hand of the state or monopolists.
Academics also react strongly to neo-liberalism. Many see it as a
negative or dangerous set of ideas or even an ideology, representing
a return to the past and a rejection of scientific progress. They focus
on its internal contradictions, its adoption of theories riddled with
weaknesses, and its oversimplification of complex problems. Equally,
they underline the repercussions of policies inspired or legitimated by
neo-liberalism. Others point to the difficulties of applying a term that
is often polemical, lacks boundaries, and whose policy prescriptions
conflict with one another and are in flux.
Our approach here differs from both the normative reactions and the
academic critiques of the term. We treat the resilience of neo-liberal
ideas as a political phenomenon to be investigated. We look at the
nature of such ideas, who holds them, how they are used, and – of
123 See Schmidt 2000, 2002, and 2008.
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course – why they remain resilient. Regardless of our personal views
about their content, we see their place and continued dominance in pol-
icy debates and political discourse as a matter to be analysed using the
tools of political explanation. We do so by investigating the possible
reasons for its resilience, including the flexibility of its ideational con-
tent, the promises that remain unfulfilled or broken, its predominance
in debates, the strategic support from interests, and its embeddedness in
institutions. All of these reasons help to explain why neo-liberal ideas
continue not only to survive but also to dominate by defining how the
key questions in political economy today are conceived, which solu-
tions are proposed, which debates about policy choices are available,
and which policy proposals are viewed as legitimate.
The resilience of neo-liberal ideas is one of the major themes of
our epoch – the importance of the market, the size and role of the
state, the nature of the welfare system, the extent of competition,
the purposes and basis of regulation, the shaping of labour markets,
and the rules that govern corporations. Such ideas are at the core of
politics across many different domains and polities. The strength of
reaction to the concept of neo-liberalism alone indicates its impor-
tance. Indeed, in the light of Keynes’s powerful insight about the
ideational sources of economic decision making, we believe that inves-
tigating neo-liberal ideas is central to understanding Europe’s political
economy.
References
Abdelal, Rawi, Mark Blyth, and Craig Parsons (eds.). 2010. Constructing
the International Economy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Akerlof, George A., and Robert J. Shiller. 2009. Animal Spirits. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Amable, Bruno. 2011. ‘Morals and Politics in the Ideology of Neo-
Liberalism’, Socio-Economic Review 9: 3–30.
Apeldoorn, Baastian van, Jan Drahokoupil, and Laura Horn (eds.). 2008.
Contradictions and Limits of Neoliberal European Governance: From
Lisbon to Lisbon. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Audier, Serge. 2012a. Ne´o-Libe´ralisme(s): Une Arche´ologie Intellectuelle.
Paris: Grasset.
Audier, Serge. 2012b. Le Colloque Lippmann: Aux Origines du ‘Ne´o-
Libe´ralisme’. Paris: Le Bord de l’Eau.
Theorizing ideational continuity 41
Ban, Cornel. 2012. ‘Translating the IMF: Crisis, Aperture and the Fund’s
Teaching Institutes’. Paper prepared for the GR:EEN Conference on
International Economic Actors, Boston University, 5–6 March 2012.
Ban, Cornel. (In press.) ‘Heinrich von Stackelberg and the Diffusion of Ordo-
Liberal Economics in Franco’s Spain’, History of Economic Ideas.
Baumgartner, Frank R., and Bryan D. Jones. 1993. Agendas and Instability
in American Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Beckert, Jens. 2011. ‘Imagined Futures: Fictionality in Economic Action’.
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies (MPfIG) Discussion
Paper 11/8.
Be´land, Daniel, and Robert Cox (eds.). 2011. Ideas and Politics in Social
Science Research. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Berman, Sheri. 1998. The Social Democratic Movement: Ideas and Politics
in theMaking of Interwar Europe. Cambridge,MA:Harvard University
Press.
Berman, Sheri. 2006. The Primacy of Politics: Social Democracy and the
Making of Europe’s Twentieth Century. New York: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Bermeo, Nancy, and Jonas Pontusson. 2012. Coping with Crisis: Govern-
ment Reactions to the Great Recession. New York: Russell Sage Foun-
dation.
Bevir, Mark. 2010. Democratic Governance. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni-
versity Press.
Block, Fred. 1977. ‘The Ruling Class Does Not Rule: Notes on the Marxist
Theory of the State’, Socialist Revolution 33 (May–June): 7–28.
Blyth, Mark M. 1997. ‘Any More Bright Ideas?: The Ideational Turn in
Comparative Political Economy’, Comparative Politics 29 (2): 229–50.
Blyth, Mark. 2002. Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institu-
tional Change in the Twentieth Century. New York: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Blyth, Mark. 2013a. ‘Paradigms and Paradox: The Politics of Economic
Ideas in Two Moments of Crisis’, Governance 26 (2): 197–215.
Blyth, Mark. 2013b. Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea. New York
and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Boas, Taylor, and Jordan Gans-Morse. 2009. ‘Neo-Liberalism: From New
Liberal Philosophy to Anti-Liberal Slogan’, Studies in Comparative
International Development 44 (2): 137–61.
Brenner, Neil, Jamie Peck, and Nik Theodore. 2010. ‘After Neoliberaliza-
tion?’, Globalizations 7 (3): 327–45.
Bu¨the, Tim, and Walter Mattli. 2011. The New Global Rulers: The Privati-
zation of Regulation in the World Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
42 Theorizing ideational continuity
Cafruny, AlanW., andMagnus Ryner. 2003. A Ruined Fortress? Neoliberal
Hegemony and Transformation in Europe. Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield.
Callinicos, Alex. 2010. Bonfire of Illusions: The Twin Crises of the Liberal
World. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Campbell, John L. 1998. ‘Institutional Analysis and the Role of Ideas in
Political Economy,’ Theory and Society 27: 377–409.
Campbell, John L. 2004. Institutional Change and Globalization. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Campbell, John L., and Ove K. Pedersen. 2010. ‘Knowledge Regimes and
Comparative Political Economy’. In Ideas and Politics in Social Science
Research, edited by Daniel Be´land and Robert H. Cox (167–90). New
York: Oxford University Press.
Carstensen, Martin B. 2011. ‘Paradigm Man vs. the Bricoleur: Bricolage
as an Alternative Vision of Agency in Ideational Change’, European
Political Science Review 3: 147–67.
Carstensen, Martin B. 2012. ‘Do We Know a New Idea When We See
It?: Economic Crisis, Changing Ideas and the Problem of Ideational
Infinite Regress’. Paper prepared for presentation at the Department
of Business and Politics Paper Seminar, 22–23 November, Copenhagen
Business School.
Cerny, Philip. 2008. ‘Embedding Neoliberalism: The Evolution of a Hege-
monic Paradigm’, The Journal of Trade and International Diplomacy
2 (1): 1–46.
Coen, David, and Mark Thatcher (eds.). 2005. ‘The New Governance of
Markets’, Special Issue, Governance 18 (3).
Crouch, Colin. 2011. The Strange Non-Death of Neo-Liberalism. Cam-
bridge, UK: Polity Press.
Culpepper, Pepper. 2011. Quiet Politics and Business Power: Corporate
Control in Europe and Japan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cyrulnik, Boris. 2003. Le Murmure des fantoˆmes. Paris: Odile Jacob.
Denham, Andrew. 1996. Think Tanks of the New Right. Aldershot: Dart-
mouth.
Denord, Franc¸ois. 2007.Ne´o-Libe´ralisme Version Franc¸aise: Histoire d’une
Ide´ologie Politique. Paris: Demopolis.
DiMaggio, Paul J., and Walter W. Powell. 1991. ‘Introduction’. In The New
Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, edited by W. W. Powell
and P. J. DiMaggio. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Dryzek, John. 2000. Deliberative Democracy and Beyond. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Epstein, Charlotte. 2008. The Power of Words in International Relations:
Birth of an Anti-Whaling Discourse. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Theorizing ideational continuity 43
Eucken, Walter. 1950. The Foundations of Economics. History and Theory
of Economic Reality. London: Edinburgh, Glasgow.
Evans, Peter, and William Sewell. 2013. ‘The Neoliberal Era: Ideology, Pol-
icy, and Social Effects’. In Social Resilience in the Neo-Liberal Era,
edited by Peter Hall and Miche`le Lamont (35–68). Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Ferrera, Maurizio. 2005. The Boundaries of Welfare: European Integra-
tion and the New Spatial Politics of Social Protection. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. ‘International Norm
Dynamics and Political Change’, International Organization 52: 887–
917.
Fioretos, Orfeo. 2011. Creative Reconstructions: Multilateralism and Euro-
pean Varieties of Capitalism after 1950. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press.
Fleck, Ludwik. 1980. Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen
Tatsache: Einfu¨hrung in die Lehre vom Denkstil und Denkkollektiv.
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag (reprint 1935).
Fligstein, Neil. 2010. ‘Politics, the Reorganization of the Economy,
and Income Inequality, 1980–2009’, Politics & Society 38(2): 233–
42.
Fligstein, Neil, and IonaMara-Drita. 1996. ‘How toMake aMarket: Reflec-
tions on the Attempt to Create a Single Market in the European Union’,
American Journal of Sociology 102: 1–32.
Foucault, Michel. 2000. Power: Essential Works of Foucault, 1954–
1984, Vol. 3. Edited by J. D. Faubion. New York: The New
Press.
Foucault, Michel. 2004. Naissance de la biopolitique: Cours au Colle`ge de
France, 1978–1979. Paris: Gallimard/Seuil.
Fourcade, Marion. 2009. Economists and Societies: Discipline and Profes-
sion in the United States, Britain, & France, 1890s to 1990s. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Fourcade, Marion, and Joachim Savelsberg. 2006. ‘Global Processes,
National Institutions, Local Bricolage: Shaping Law in an Era of Glob-
alization’, Law and Social Inquiry 31 (3): 513–19.
Fourcade-Gourinchas, Marion, and Sarah L. Babb. 2002. ‘The Rebirth of
the Liberal Creed: Paths to Neoliberalism in Four Countries’, American
Journal of Sociology 108 (3): 533–79.
Freeden,Michael. 1978.TheNewLiberalism: An Ideology of Social Reform.
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Freeden, Michael. 2003. Ideology: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
44 Theorizing ideational continuity
Freeden, Michael. 2005. Liberal Languages: Ideological Imaginations and
Twentieth Century Progressive Thought. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Friedman, Milton. 1962. Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Gamble, Andrew. 1996.Hayek: The IronCage of Liberty. Cambridge: Polity
Press.
Gamble, Andrew. 2009. The Spectre at the Feast: Capitalist Crisis and the
Politics of Recession. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Garsten, Bryan. 2011. ‘The Rhetoric Revival in Political Theory’, Annual
Review of Political Science 14: 159–80.
Goldstein, Judith. 1993. Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy. Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press.
Goldstein, Judith, and Robert Keohane. 1993. Ideas and Foreign Policy.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Grant, Wyn, and Graham K. Wilson (eds.). 2012. The Consequences of
the Global Financial Crisis: The Rhetoric of Reform and Regulation.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Haas, Peter M. 1992. ‘Introduction: Epistemic Communities and Inter-
national Policy Coordination’, International Organization 46: 1–
35.
Habermas, Ju¨rgen. 1996. Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a
Discourse Theory. London: Polity Press.
Hacker, Jacob, and Paul Pierson. 2010. ‘Winner-Take-All Politics: Public
Policy, Political Organization, and the Precipitous Rise of Top Incomes
in the United States’, Politics & Society 38 (2): 152–204.
Hajer, Martin. 2003. ‘A Frame in the Fields: Policymaking and the Reinven-
tion of Politics’. In Deliberative Policy Analysis: Understanding Gov-
ernance in the Network Society, edited by M. Hajer and H. Wagenaar
(88–112). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Hall, Peter. 1986. Governing the Economy. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Hall, Peter. 1989. ‘Conclusion’. In The Political Power of Economic Ideas:
Keynesianism across Nations, edited by Peter Hall (361–92). Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Hall, Peter. 1993. ‘Policy Paradigms, Social Learning and the State: The
Case of Economic Policy-Making in Britain’, Comparative Politics 25:
275–96.
Hall, Peter, and Miche`le Lamont. 2013. Social Resilience in the Neoliberal
Era. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hall, Peter, and David Soskice. 2001. Varieties of Capitalism. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Theorizing ideational continuity 45
Hancke´, Bob, Martin Rhodes, and Mark Thatcher (eds.). 2007. Beyond
Varieties of Capitalism: Contradictions, Complementarities and
Change. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hansen, Randell, and Desmond King. 2001. ‘Eugenic Ideas, Political Inter-
ests, and Policy Variance’, World Politics 53: 237–63.
Hartwich, Oliver M. 2009. ‘Neoliberalism: The Genesis of a Political Swear-
word’. CIS Occasional Paper 114. St. Leonards, Australia: The Centre
for Independent Studies.
Harvey, David. 2005. A Brief History of Neo-Liberalism. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Hay, Colin. 2001. ‘The “Crisis” of Keynesianism and the Rise of Neoliber-
alism in Britain: An Ideational Institutionalist Approach’. In The Rise of
Neoliberalism and Institutional Analysis, edited by John L. Campbell
and Ove K. Pedersen (193–218). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Hay, Colin. 2004. ‘The Normalizing Role of Rationalist Assumptions in the
Institutionalist Embedding of Neo-Liberalism’, Economy and Society
33(4): 500–27.
Hay, C. 2006. ‘Constructivist Institutionalism’. In The Oxford Handbook
of Political Institutions, edited by R. A. W. Rhodes, S. Binder, and B.
Rockman (56–74) Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hayek, Friedrich von. 1944. The Road to Serfdom. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Heclo, Hugh. 1974. Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden. New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Helleiner, Eric. 2003. ‘Economic Liberalism and Its Critics: The Past as
Prologue?’, Review of International Political Economy 10 (4): 685–
96.
Hermann, Christoph. 2007. ‘Neoliberalism in the European Union’, Studies
in Political Economy 79: 61–89.
Jessop, Robert. 2002. The Future of the Capitalist State. Cambridge: Polity
Press.
Jobert, Bruno. 1989. ‘TheNormative Frameworks of Public Policy’, Political
Studies 37: 376–86.
Jobert, Bruno (ed.). 1994. Le Tournant Ne´olibe´ral en Europe. Paris:
L’Harmattan.
Jobert, Bruno, and Pierre Muller. 1987. L’E´tat en Action: Poli-
tiques Publiques et Corporatismes. Paris: Presses Universitaires de
France.
Katzenstein, Peter (ed.). 1978. Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Policies
of Advanced Industrialized States. Madison: University of Wisconsin
Press.
46 Theorizing ideational continuity
Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. Activists Beyond Borders:
Advocacy Networks in International Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Uni-
versity Press.
Kerwer, Dieter. 2005. ‘Holding Global Regulators Accountable: The Case
of Credit Rating Agencies’, Governance, 18(3): 453–75.
Kingdon, John W. 1984. Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies. New
York: Longman.
Kuhn, Thomas. 1970. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 2nd ed.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Laclau, Ernesto, and Chantal Mouffe. 1985. Hegemony and Socialist Strat-
egy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics. Oxford: Blackwell.
Larner, Wendy. 2000. ‘Neo-liberalism: Policy, Ideology, Governmentality’,
Studies in Political Economy 63, 1–25.
Lehmbruch, Gerhard. 2001. ‘Institutional Embedding ofMarket Economies:
The German Model and Its Impact on Japan’. In The Origins of
Nonliberal Capitalism: Germany and Japan in Comparison, edited by
Wolfgang Streeck and K. Yamamura. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press.
Lehmbruch, Gerhard, and Philippe Schmitter. 1982. Patterns of Corporatist
Policymaking. London: Sage Publications.
Lindblom, Charles E. 1977. Politics and Markets. New York: Basic Books.
MacKenzie, Daniel, Fabian Muniesa, and Lucia Siu. 2007. Do Economists
Make Markets?: On the Performativity of Economics. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
MacKenzie, Donald. 2006.AnEngineNot a Camera: How FinancialModels
Shape Markets. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
MacKinnon, Daniel, and Kate Driscoll Derickson. 2012. ‘From Resilience to
Resourcefulness: A Critique of Resilience Policy and Activism’, Progress
in Human Geography, online version, published 8 August 2012.
Mahoney, James, and Kathleen Thelen. 2009. Explaining Institutional
Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Majone, Giandomenico. 1989. Evidence, Argument, and Persuasion in the
Policy Process. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Mandelkern, Ronen, and Michael Shalev. 2010. ‘Power and the Ascendance
of New Economic Policy Ideas: Lessons from the 1980s Crisis in Israel’,
World Politics 62 (3): 459–95.
Masten, Ann, Karin Best, and Norman Garmezy. 1990. ‘Resilience and
Development: Contributions from the Study of Children Who Over-
come Adversity’, Development and Psychopathology 2: 425–44.
McNamara, Kathleen. 1998. The Currency of Ideas: Monetary Politics in
the European Union. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Theorizing ideational continuity 47
Mehta, Jal. 2011. ‘From “Whether” to “How”: The Varied Role of Ideas
in Politics’. In Ideas and Politics in Social Science Research, edited by
Daniel Be´land and Robert Cox (23–46). Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Mirowski, Philip, and Dieter Plehwe. 2009. The Road from Mont Pe´lerin:
The Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Mudge, Stephanie. 2008. ‘What Is Neo-liberalism?’, Socio-Economic
Review 6: 703–31.
Mu¨gge, Daniel. 2011. ‘From Pragmatism to Dogmatism: European Union
Governance, Policy Paradigms and Financial Meltdown’,New Political
Economy 16 (2): 185–206.
Muller, Pierre. 1995. ‘Les Politiques Publiques comme Construction d’un
Rapport au Monde’. In La Construction du Sens dans les Politiques
Publiques: De´bats Autour de la Notion de Re´fe´rentiel, edited by Alain
Faure, Gielles Pollet, and Philippe Warin. Paris: L’Harmattan.
Nemo, Philippe, and Jean Petitot. 2006. Histoire du Libe´ralisme en Europe.
Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Norris, Fran H., Susan P. Stevens, Betty Pfefferbaum, Karen F. Wyche,
and Rose L. Pfefferbaum. 2008. ‘Community Resilience as a
Metaphor, Theory, Set of Capacities, and Strategy for Disaster Readi-
ness’, American Journal of Community Psychology, 41(1–2): 127–
50.
Onuf, Nicholas. 1989.World ofOurMaking. Columbia: University of South
Carolina Press.
Overbeek, Henk, and Baastian van Apeldoorn. 2012. Neoliberalism in Cri-
sis. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Pautz, Hartwig. 2012. Think Tanks, Social Democracy and Social Policy.
Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Peck, Jamie. 2001. ‘Neoliberalizing States: Thin Policies/Hard Outcomes’,
Progress in Human Geography 25 (3): 445–55.
Peck, Jamie. 2010. Constructions of Neo-Liberal Reason. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Peck, Jamie and Tickell, Adam 2002. ’Neoliberalizing Space’, Antipode 34
(3): 380–404.
Peck, Jamie, Nik Theodore, and Neil Brenner. 2009. ‘Postneoliberalism and
Its Malcontents’, Antipode 41(S1): 94–116.
Pierson, Paul. 2004. Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Anal-
ysis Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Plehwe, Dieter. 2009. ‘Introduction’. In The Mont Pe`lerin Society, edited by
Philip Mirowski and Dieter Plehwe (1–44). Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
48 Theorizing ideational continuity
Plehwe, Dieter, Bernard Walpen, and Gisela Neunho¨ffer. 2006. Neoliberal
Hegemony: A Global Critique. London: Routledge.
Polanyi, Karl. 1945.Origins of Our Time: The Great Transformation. Lon-
don: Gollancz.
Ptak, Ralf. 2009. ‘Neoliberalism in Germany: Revisiting the Ordo-liberal
Foundations of the Social Market Economy’. In The Mont Pe`lerin Soci-
ety, edited by PhilipMirowski and Dieter Plehwe (98–138). Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
Rein, Martin, and D. A. Schon. 1994. Frame Reflection Toward the Reso-
lution of Intractable Policy Controversies. New York: Basic Books.
Rodrik, Dani. 2011. The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future
of the World Economy. New York: W. W. Norton.
Roe, Emery. 1994.Narrative Policy Analysis: Theory and Practice. Durham,
NC: Duke University Press.
Rosamond, Ben. 2012. ‘The Discursive Construction of Neoliberalism: The
EU and the Contested Substance of European Economic Space’. InEuro-
pean Regionalism and the Left, edited by Gerard Strange and Owen
Worth (39–61). Manchester, England: Manchester University Press.
Rothstein, Bo. 2005. Social Traps and the Problem of Trust. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Ruggie, John. 1982. ‘International Regimes, Transactions, and Change:
Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order’, International
Organization 36: 379–415.
Sabatier, Paul, and Hank C. Jenkins-Smith (eds.). 1993. Policy Change and
Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach. Boulder, CO: Westview
Press.
Scharpf, Fritz W. 2012. ‘Legitimacy Intermediation in the Multilevel Euro-
pean Polity and Its Collapse in the Euro Crisis’, MPIfGDiscussion Paper
12/6, available at www.mpifg.de/pu/mpifg dp/dp12–6.pdf.
Schmidt, Vivien A. 2000. ‘Values and Discourse in the Politics of Adjust-
ment’. In Welfare and Work in the Open Economy: Vol. 1, edited by
Fritz W. Scharpf and Vivien A. Schmidt (229–309). Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Schmidt, Vivien A. 2002. The Futures of European Capitalism. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Schmidt, Vivien A. 2006.Democracy in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Schmidt, Vivien A. 2008. ‘Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory
Power of Ideas and Discourse’, Annual Review of Political Science 11:
303–26.
Schmidt, Vivien A. 2009. ‘Putting the Political Back into Political Economy
by Bringing the State Back Yet Again’, World Politics 61 (3): 516–48.
Theorizing ideational continuity 49
Schmidt, Vivien A. 2010. ‘Taking Ideas and Discourse Seriously: Explain-
ing Change through Discursive Institutionalism as the Fourth New
Institutionalism’, European Political Science Review 2 (1): 1–
25.
Schmidt, Vivien A. 2011a. ‘Ideas and Discourse in Transformational Politi-
cal Economic Change in Europe’. In Policy Paradigms, Transnational-
ism and Domestic Politics, edited by Grace Skogstad (36–63). Toronto:
Toronto University Press.
Schmidt, Vivien A. 2011b. ‘Speaking of Change: Why Discourse Is Key to
the Dynamics of Policy Transformation’, Critical Policy Studies 5 (2):
106–26.
Seabrooke, Leonard. 2007. ‘The Everyday Social Sources of Eco-
nomic Crises: From “Great Frustrations” to “Great Revelations”
in Interwar Britain’, International Studies Quarterly 51: 795–
810.
Shonfield, Andrew. 1965. Modern Capitalism: The Changing Balance of
Public and Private Power. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sinclair, Tim. 2005. The New Masters of Capital: American Bond Rating
Agencies and the Politics of Creditworthiness. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Uni-
versity Press.
Sinclair, Tim. 2010. ‘Credit Rating Agencies’. In The Oxford Handbook of
Business and Government, edited by David Coen, GrahamWilson, and
Wyn Grant (422–39). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Steger, Manfred B., and Ravi K. Roy. 2010. Neoliberalism: A Very Short
Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stiglitz, Joseph. 2008. ‘The Fall of Wall Street Is to Market Fundamentalism
What the Fall of the Berlin Wall Was to Communism’. Interview with
Nathan Gardels, The Huffington Post (16 September).
Stone, Deborah. 1988. Policy Paradox and Political Reason. Glenview, IL:
Scott Foresman.
Streeck, Wolfgang. 2011. ‘The Crises of Democratic Capitalism’, New Left
Review 71 (September–October).
Streeck, Wolfgang, and Kathleen Thelen 2005. ‘Introduction: Institutional
Change in Advanced Political Economies’. In Beyond Continuity: Insti-
tutional Change in Advanced Political Economies, edited by Streeck
and Thelen (1–39). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Swidler, Ann. 1986. ‘Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies’, American
Sociological Review 51(2): 273–86.
Thatcher, Mark. 2007. Internationalisation and Economic Institutions.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Thatcher, Mark, and Alec Stone Sweet (eds.). 2002. The Politics of Delega-
tion, Special Issue, West European Politics 25(1).
50 Theorizing ideational continuity
Thelen, Kathleen. 1999. ‘Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Poli-
tics’. In The Annual Review of Political Science. Palo Alto, CA: Annual
Reviews.
Tribe, Keith. 2009. ‘Liberalism and Neoliberalism in Britain, 1930–1980’.
In The Road fromMont Pe`lerin: TheMaking of the Neoliberal Thought
Collective, edited by Philip Mirowski and Dieter Plehwe (68–97). Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Walker, Jeremy, and Melinda Cooper. 2011. ‘Genealogies of Resilience:
From Systems Ecology to the Political Economy of Crisis Adaptation’,
Security Dialogue 42(2): 143–60.
Wapshott, Nicolas. 2012. Keynes Hayek: The Clash That Defined Modern
Economics. New York: W. W. Norton.
Weir, Margaret. 1992. Politics and Jobs. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Weir, Margaret, and Theda Skocpol. 1985. ‘State Structures and the Possi-
bilities of “Keynesian” Responses to the Great Depression in Sweden,
Britain and the United States’. In Bringing the State Back In, edited
by Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschmayer, and Theda Skocpol (107–63).
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wendt, Alexander. 1999. Social Theory of International Politics. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Werner, Emily, and Ruth Smith. 1992. Overcoming the Odds: High Risk
Children fromBirth to Adulthood. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Wittrock, Bjo¨rn, Peter Wagner, and Hellmut Wollmann. l991. ‘Social Sci-
ence and theModern State: Knowledge, Institutions, and Societal Trans-
formations’. In Social Sciences and Modern States: National Experi-
ences and Theoretical Crossroads, edited by Peter Wagner and Carol
Hirscho.
Woll, Cornelia. 2008. Firm Interests: How Governments Shape Business
Lobbying on Global Trade. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
